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When I received the invitation for admission interview from the University of Tartu, a revolution 
in my homeland, Armenia, had just begun. On the day of the interview, I hardly could focus: all 
my thoughts were in the streets where hundreds of thousands of protestors gathered to reject the 
autocratic regime and establish democracy. Both missions were successful: Armenian citizens 
forced the autocrat to resign, and I got accepted to the University of Tartu.  
With the Velvet Revolution came high hopes for democracy, equality, and growth. But along with 
those, radical and extreme right-wing groups rose to fight the post-revolutionary changes which 
they saw as anti-national. They received the support of political elites deprived of power. 
I was alarmed by these new developments and started writing my thesis with a truly revolutionary 
desire to resolve the far-right “issue” in Armenia. But as I moved forward through exciting 
exploration and writing process my emotions settled down and ambitions became more doable. 
My supervisor, Andreas Ventsel, provided the support a student can only dream of.   
The knowledge and training I received at the Department of Semiotics were not only applied to 
write this thesis but were put in practice on almost daily basis in my journalistic work in a hope to 
contribute to making Armenia a bit closer to being an open society. For that, I am grateful to the 










The current thesis is a study of radical and extreme right political communities in Armenia after 
the Velvet Revolution which happened in the country in 2018. The revolution resulted in a rapid 
and unforeseen fall of the authoritarian regime which has been ruling the country for two decades. 
A new, more progressive force came to power bringing with it hopes for democratic changes for 
Armenia (Lanskoy, Suthers 2019; Feldman, Alibašić 2019; Zolyan 2018, Shirinyan 2018; 
Abrahamian, Shagoyan 2018). Emerging processes of liberalization and democratization in the 
country are, however, followed by a significant rise of the far-right manifested in both appearance 
of many new far-right political formations and in rise of visibility of old radical groups. The radical 
and extreme right political formations pose serious threat to minority populations and, by securing 
support from political elites and the media, they may influence the success of democratic reforms 
in the country.  
 I identify the radical and extreme right communities duscussed in this thesis with Roger 
Griffin’s term groupuscular right, a concept describing small, non-party political formations 
without any formal hierarchy. I analyze far-right meaning-making based on the data collected by 
non-participatory observation from social media pages of selected groupuscules in November 1-
30, 2019. The analysis has two main aims. Firstly, I discuss the construction of otherness in the 
far-right dicourse and the place of conspiracy theories and narratives about the queer community 
in Armenia in that discourse. I built my argumentation on the scholarship of Tartu-Moscow school 
of cultural semiotics and later succesful application by semioticians at the University of Tartu of 
the cultural semiotic framework for the analysis of far-right political discourses. Secondly, I follow 
the circulation of certain specific stances both in the far-right discourse and in the discourse of 
three major conservative political parties of Armenia, including the former ruling party. I analyze 
the transformation of the far-right claims in the communication of mainstream politicians using 
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the notions of resemiotization. Using Lotman’s concept of self model and building on the example 
of Istanbul Convention I show contrudiction in standpoints of the mainstream conservative parties  
Results obtained in this work may contribute to research on the rise of the far-right in post-
Soviet countries, particularly those that experienced liberalizing turn. The semiotic approach 
adopted in the thesis allows to examine overlaps in meanings of seemingly disconnected political 


















1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
In this chapter I present the research aims of the thesis and research questions. I will then discuss 
relevance of the work for studies in far-right politics  in Armenia and other post-Soviet countries 
that have recently gone through democratic turn. I will also address shortly potential implications 
that this research may have outside of the context of any specific country.  
 
1.1. Aim of the research and research questions 
This thesis adopts a cultural semiotic approach to provide qualitative analysis of the conservative 
and ultraconservative discourses in Armenia after the Velvet Revolution of 2018. The work 
consists of two main sections. In the first section I follow the discourse of radical and extreme 
right communities, specifically aiming to analyze their discursive construction of otherness in the 
model comprised of self, boundary and other (Sonesson 2000). I observed social media pages of 
four groups of activists, and I use the notion of groupuscule i.e., small political entities striving to 
undermine liberal democratic system (Griffin 2003), to describe their structural organization and 
meaning-making strategies. 
In the second section I aim to track the specific extreme and radical right claims and 
narratives in the major political parties’ discourse. Except for the ruling Civil Contract, all three 
major parties in Armenian politics are conservative in a sense of general inclination towards 
preservation of existing social and cultural norms. All three parties have also utilized nationalism. 
I follow overlaps in umbrella topics and messaging between the mainstream conservative parties 
and the groupuscular right and use the notion of resemiotization to analyze the evolution of specific 
claims from temporal kinds of meaning-making (such as a talk at a protest) towards more durable 
kinds (such as legislative proposal). Thus, this thesis aims to answer two research questions:  
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1. How does the far-right in Armenia construct the otherness?  
2. How specific claims from far-right discourse transform in the discourse of mainstream 
conservative political parties?  
The first research question helps to describe the main discursive strategies applied by the 
groupuscular right in Armenia; it allows to confirm that far-right political formations pose threat 
first of all to minorities (Gordon 2020), as well as allows to explain the basis of the far-right 
activists’ criticism of the post-revolutionary political elites.  The second research question helps to 
describe the similarities between the discourses of the groupuscular right and mainstream 
conservative political parties.  
 The current thesis does not address the problem of perception and interpretation of the 
topics and narratives of the groupucular right by their audience or the general public. The work 
also does not discuss alleged sponsoring of the groupuscular right by certain mainstream political 
actors, leaving this question for another investigation to explore.  The thesis also does not discuss 
possible changes in political life of Armenia after the war with Azerbaijan in fall 2020.  
 
1.2. Relevance of the work 
Armenia, a country governed by a semi-authoritarian regime for two decades, has adopted an anti-
corruption and pro-democracy agenda after the Velvet Revolution. However, the country also 
experiences a significant rise in activities and visibility of the far-right communities and 
organizations. As in other post-Soviet countries, specifically in Georgia and Ukraine, the far-right 
rise happens in the context of conservative, Orthodox Christian societies after a crucial liberalizing 
turn (Gordon 2020:7). 2020 Freedom House special report points out that while the rise of the far-
right poses threat to incipient democratic transformations in general, it hits first of all vulnerable 
communities (2020:2). In Armenia, it is the sexual minorities that have become the main target of 
the far-right actors thus being exposed to both hate speech and physical violence.  
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In general, discourses of otherness often turn into discourses of exclusion, and, depending 
on circumstances, ethnic, religious or other groups discriminated against upon a given feature may 
become the “prototype of alterity” (Nöth, Santaella 2007). From the position of the groupuscular 
right the otherness is a fixed feature, a close-to-natural fact, while in reality, as Nöth and Santaella 
put it, it is “nothing but a discursive position” (ibid.). Authors point out that the studies of 
marginalization should be therefore a priority for human sciences. This thesis is an attempt to 
complement the knowledge about the radical and extreme rightism and the process of 
marginalization of queer people in a traditionalist society. In this work, queerness is understood as 
gender identity outside of heterosexuality and socially defined dichotomy of the woman/feminine 
and man/masculine. Additionally, while the development of the far-right movements in Europe 
after World War II has been thoroughly investigated (including by Roger Griffin whose work 
forms a part of the theoretical framework of the current thesis), not so much has been written about 
the respective processes in those post-Soviet countries that went through democratic revolutions 
since the turn of the second millennium.  
The research on semiotics of culture conducted by Tartu-Moscow School scholars has 
proven to be an effective tool to study extreme right communities (see, for example, Madisson, 
Ventsel 2016a, 2016b, 2018, Damčević, Rodik 2018). Using the notion of otherness, which has 
been central for the cultural semiotic paradigm (Sonesson 2000), I discuss the narratives of the 
groupuscular right. A thorough analysis of these narratives can be important for better 
understanding the groupuscular right discourse and for combating hateful and, when it is picked 
up by mainstream politicians, potentially dangerous speech (Maynard, Benesch 2016). This 
speech is often directed against the vulnerable groups of population and able to undermine 
democratization processes. Furthermore, some narratives (such as the conspirological discourse 
around Council of Europe Istanbul Convention discussed in chapter 6) are travelling from country 
to country across Europe (Ketelaars 2019, Damčević, Rodik 2018:37-38). Therefore, the findings 
of this thesis might be relevant for further research outside of the context of post-revolutionary 
Armenia.  
Finally, research has been conducted on the influence of extreme and radical right 
movements on policy making, direct or indirect (i.e. through influence of radical right parties on 
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other parties; Kyung 2015, Mudde 2007:277-292). However, the realm of impact of far-right 
movements on mainstream politics, as well as mechanisms of that impact still remain 
underexplored. The current thesis will take a closer look at the semiotic mechanisms of travelling 
of radical and extreme right stances to the parliamentary pedestals by analyzing the circulation of 
specific claims and topics both in groupuscular right and mainstream political discourse. The work 
thus aims to contribute to more comprehensive understanding of how mainstream conservative 


























In this section I will elaborate the method of data collection and justify my selection of 
groupuscules and political parties to observe. I will also provide short contextual information about 
the selected groupuscules and political parties.  
 
2.1. Data collection  
To collect data for this thesis I performed non-participatory observation of seven Facebook pages 
and accounts of right-wing activists on November 1-30, 2019. This period was chosen due to 
intense coverage that right-wing activists and initiatives received in press and social media. The 
month was characterized by a series of scandals in the media around the topics of national identity 
and queer rights which dominated the public discussion. Due to these developments the 
government was accused of being unable to form the agenda of public discussions around post-
revolutionary reforms and giving way to manipulative narratives endangering the wellbeing of 
minority groups. Some of these scandals were triggered by right-wing activists I observed (such 
as huZANQ uZANG case discussed in chapter 6). Activists organized protests and actions during 
the whole month, which although of small scale, served as spectacles to be broadcast online. Topics 
of these protests reached the level of parliamentary discussion. Furthermore, criticism of 
educational reform by political parties turned into weeks of protests that right-wing activists also 
joined. Eventually, Prime Minister Pashinyan had to address the Parliament with an emotional 
speech about the scandal around a transgender athlete, declaring that “this person is under my 
personal defense”. His speech managed to stop the nationwide wave of hate speech directed to the 
athlete but did not address the issues of queer rights at large.   
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I chose Facebook as a platform for observation due to its popularity: although some 
groupuscules have also Twitter and Vkontakte pages, those are not nearly as active as Facebook 
pages. YouTube was not chosen due to limitation to only video content, while on Facebook I 
observed both video and textual content (in video content verbal text uttered in the video mode 
was what interested me, I do not analyze visual meaning-making in this thesis). There were two 
sets of pages: that of groupucular right activists and initiatives, and that of mainstream conservative 
politicians. In case available, I also collected manifests and self-descriptive texts on websites of 
the initiatives and parties, as well as used statements made regarding important events outside of 
selected period of observation (such as regarding the attack in Shurnukh village in 2018 which 
resulted in a large wave of hate speech against queer community).  
I outlined four groupuscules formed both before and after the revolution: Veto, Adekvad, 
Kamq, Liberation Movement. The selection was based on the high frequency of coverage in news 
outlets and activeness on Facebook. The Liberation Movement is led by people who are engaged 
in two other groups, namely, Informational-Analytical Center “Luys” and Initiative for Protection 
of Christian Value System and Traditional Family. Because the activities and members or both 
groups do not differ significantly from that of the Liberation Movement, I will not consider them 
separately in this thesis and my choice of the Liberation Movement is not motivated by any special 
characteristics of this title per se.  
Using the concept of groupuscule and theoretical framework of cultural semiotics I studied 
umbrella topics and most common narratives among the groupuscular right in post-revolutionary 
Armenia. All groupuscules are critical of the new government which is perceived as liberal. And 
all of them reveal strong opposition to the “Western values” as well as sympathy towards Russia. 
The data I collected shows that the groupuscules are united in their strong opposition to queer 
community (consequently, they are united in support of traditional gender roles), and 
conspirological discourse is characteristic of the groupuscular right in Armenia. The two most 
popular such narratives are conspiracy theories about George Soros and Istanbul Convention. Both 
ofthese narratives fit into the framework of New World Order conspiracy theories (Madisson 
2016a).  
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Furthermore, I selected three political parties representing the most significant 
conservative political forces in the country: Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), Prosperous 
Armenia (PA) and  Armenian Revolutionary Federation also known as Dashnaktsutyun (ARF). If 
in the case of the groupuscules I was outlining main topics based on collected data, in the case of 
political parties I was following parties’ statements to see if they respond to or adopt the above-
mentioned topics. Thus, I collected statements (both official and those from individual party 
members), interviews and other texts mentioning the topics of queer rights, George Soros or 
Istanbul Convention narratives during November 1-30. The statements were collected from official 
websites of RPA and ARF which provide extensive archives of press publications, statements and 
Facebook posts of party members. In case of PA, the party does not have an active website, 
therefore I used Google advanced search to find press publications and manually collected data 
from Facebook pages of top three party officials։ PA leader Gagik Tsarukyan, secretary of PA bloc 
in Parliament Arman Abovyan, and PA leader in 2015-2017 Naira Zohrabyan. Press publications 
I collected were not limited to statements of those three politicians but also, based on search results, 
included texts by other PA members, most often Gevorg Petrosyan, an MP who has been a hero 
of several scandals around queer rights. All together I worked with data comprised of over 400 
posts by the groupuscular right and around 50 posts, interviews and speeches by politicians. 
 
2.2. Research material: names and brief introduction to groupuscules and parties 
In this section I will provide short contextual information about the groupuscules and political 
parties mentioned in this thesis. I observed Facebook pages of the following groupuscules and 
accounts of their leaders/most active members (there is often no clear-cut hierarchy in the 
groupuscular structure): 
a) Adekvad․ The initiative was founded by Artur Danielyan and Narek Malian. The latter 
then left it to start his own initiative, Veto (see below). Danielyan was a member of Civil Contract 
party which came to power in Armenia after the Velvet Revolution. However, he left the party 
before the events of 2018, according to him, because of ideological differences. Danielyan studied 
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in Moscow and London; in Armenia he was appointed as director of a factory. Currently, he is not 
known to hold any business or political position apart from Adekvad.  
In May 2019 Adekvad was registered as a political party. At the inauguration ceremony 
Danilyan declared that Adekvad is yet another fake, “decorative” political party in the fake 
political “theater” of Armenia. Adekvad allies call them a “congregation” and are the only 
groupuscule I observed which released detailed self-descriptive texts (see more on Adekvad 
ideology in section 3.4). I observed Facebook page of Adekvad and Danielyan’s account.  
b) Kamq. Kamq was founded by Vahagn Chakhalyan, an Armenian nationalist activist 
from Samtskhe–Javakheti region of Georgia. The region has a large Armenian population, and 
Chakhalyan was advocating for its bigger autonomy from Tbilisi. He was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment in 2009 for possession of firearms and ammunition, and hooliganism. He was 
released on amnesty in 2013. After the Velvet Revolution Chakhalyan founded Kamq to combat 
multiculturalism and globalisation influence in Armenia. Kamq is concentrated on fighting 
Istanbul Convention as embodiment of decadence of the globalist West and the threat to Armenian 
culture. They often organize street protests and petition-signing actions. They claim 50,000 
citizens signed petition against the convention, however, the content of the convention is 
misrepresented by Kamq during signature-collecting events: people are asked to sign the petition 
against gay marriages rather than against domestic violence.  
On November 1, 2019, Kamq activists interrupted the rehearsal of modern dance 
performance huZANQ uZANG. On the next day, self-described Istanbul Convention fighter and 
former president Robert Kocharyan’s supporter Narek Sargsyan attacked the dancers by running 
into the performance territory and pouring brilliant green dye on dancers (the dye, zelyonka, has 
become a popular tool to attack political opponents among the Russian pro-government fighting 
squads (Backer, Olszanecka 2019); in Armenia this was the first such attack). On November 3, 
Kamq members came back to the performance territory to perform a frankincense burning ritual 
to “kick out the evil forces”. The chain of events was covered extensively in the press and went 
viral in social media.  
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I observed Kamq page on Facebook as well as the account under the name “Vahagn 
Chakhalyan”. Chakhalyan has several accounts, however, the content is usually repeated on those.  
c) Veto. Adekvad co-founder Narek Malian left the group to start his own initiative, Veto. 
Malian is a PR specialist who worked as advisor to the former Chief of Police. Malian taught PR 
in Yerevan State University and authored detective novels about PR specialists. Nearly all Veto 
messages and activities are constructed around conspiracy theory about liberal billionaire George 
Soros. Malian uses his ties among former politicians and journalists, as well as his knowledge in 
PR to promote the activities of his group. He is the only activist I observed who talked about a 
possibility of a political career in the future when asked about it by a journalist. However, no 
statements or actions were taken by him or other Veto members to enter the institutionalized 
political scene.    
d) Liberation Movement. This initiative is one of the many minute formations uniting a 
group of activists advocating for so-called traditional values and systematically attacking the queer 
community. People in this group exhibit deep religiosity and have ties among Armenian clergy as 
well as among Russian pro-Orthodox Church activists. They disseminate both the narratives about 
Soros and the Istanbul Convention. The attacks on queer community include hate speech in the 
online sphere and real-life protests and actions.  
Liberation Movement activists, together with Kamq members, interrupted the rehearsal of 
the modern dance performance huZANQ uZANG on the grounds of it being a “lesbian” and 
“satanist” event. Members of the Liberation Movement are the only groupuscular community in 
my selection that was active before the revolution. As the Liberation Movement Facebook page is 
not updated regularly, I observed only the account of one of the leaders of the movement, Hayk 
Ayvazyan.  
I observed the following political parties:  
a) Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). The party ruled in Armenia for two decades. It is 
characterized by national-conservative ideology (Zolyan 2018, Danielyan 2014:59).  It had more 
than 165,000 members, which comprises around 6,5% of the entire electorate in the country. 
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However, the party failed to make it to the 5% threshold at the parliamentary elections after the 
revolution.   
b) Prosperous Armenia (PA). One of the biggest parties in the country was elected as 
second largest force in the Parliament in the 2018 as well as in 2017 and 2012 elections. It is 
formed around the figure of oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, one of the richest men in the country. It is 
self-described as a center-right party. 
c) Armenian Revolutionary Federation or Dashnaktsutyun (ARF). This is the oldest party 
of Armenia founded in 1890. It has a significant influence in Diaspora and is represented in all 
major Armenian communities in Diaspora. Historically, ARF had nationalist-socialist ideology. 
Currently, ARF is characterized by nationalist-conservative ideology (Danielyan 2014:88). Before 
the revolution it was in coalition with the ruling RPA. In 2018, it failed to make the 5% threshold 














3. ARMENIA: BETWEEN THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT AND DEMOCRATIC 
CHANGE 
 
In this section I will provide a brief overview of the historical context and current narratives of 
existential threat in Armenian public discourse. I will also discuss the Velvet Revolution and the 
hopes of not only economic, but cultural change that it created. 
 
3.1. The nation under existential threat  
Armenians are united by language, religion, and shared history. Armenian script was created in 
the 5th century AD, bringing with it a rich tradition of written literature. The Kingdom of Armenia 
was the first to adopt Christianity as a state religion (301 AD). Armenian Apostolic Church 
separated from the rest of the Christian churches after the Council of Chalcedon in 5th century and 
became largely national, meaning that it is tied to a specific ethnicity: it practices in Armenia and 
diaspora communities. Armenians lost statehood in 11th century AD. In 13th century Armenians 
formed the Kingdom of Kilikia, which existed until late 14th century. For hundreds of years after 
that, Armenians existed divided between Ottoman, Persian and Russian empires.  
 The history of the nation is dominated by the narratives of struggle against powerful 
invaders, first of all, the Turks. The culmination of centuries of oppression by imperial powers was 
in 1915 when the Ottoman Empire orchestrated a mass killing of Christian populations, first of all 
Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks. The genocide took lives of 1,5 million Armenians and forced 
many more to flee; nowadays, more ethnic Armenians live in the Diaspora than in the Republic of 
Armenia itself. The fear and anger, fueled by Turkey’s refusal to acklowledge that genocide was 
ever committed agains Armenian and other Christian populations, remain vivid in mass 
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consciosness. These feelings are further reinforced by the fact that Turkey keeps it’s borders closed 
for Armenia, the two countries have no diplomatic relations.  
 After the World War I, in 1918, an independent state was established for a short 2-year 
period before Soviet union took over the South Caucasus. With Soviet decay and Perestroika, 
Armenia was stormed by large-scale protests. First in 1987 in Armenian-populated Nagorno-
Karabakh autonomous oblast (offitially part of Azerbaijan SSR) and then in Yerevan itself 
hundreds of thousands took the streets demanding to rejoin Nagorno Karabakh with Armenia. 
Moscow feared a dangerous precedent: it refused to redraw borders, announced curfew and sent 
tanks to calm down the tensions in Armenia. Azerbaijan responded by ethnic pogroms in 
Armenian-populated city of Sumgait. Soon, the two neighbors became intolerant towards each 
others’ presence: hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes as ethnic 
tentions both in Armenia and Azerbaijan became severe. In 1991, after years of protests, Armenia 
declared independance from the Soviet Union. Shortly after, war with Azerbaijan broke out, in 
which Armenia took over Karabakh and seven regions of Azerbaijan. The ceasefire was 
established in 1994, and the conflict remained frozen up until recently. In September-October 
2020, the war broke out again. This time Azerbaijan succedeed, taking back the seven regions and 
parts of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Armenia was shaken once again not only by the defeat, but also 
by the fact that Turkey provided crucial military and diplomatic support to Azerbaijan thus 
renewing fears of Turkish aggression.  
 Turkish threat, history dominated by narratives of struggle and opression from greater 
powers, calamities of recent decades (devastating eathquake in 1988, war, poverty of 1990s) – all 
these phenomena create and reinforce Armenia’s perception of itself as a nation under an 
existential threat. Armenia was and still is conceived by its people as a nation under a constant 
danger of assimilation and extinction. This thought underlies general public discourse, but it is 
especially strong driving force of nationalist movements in modern-day Armenia (Rutland 
1994:840). Most of these movements are of ethno-nationalist kind; they believe ethno-national 
belonging is a duty which importance is greater than any individual-level phenomena. The crucial 
part of fulfilling that duty is seen in the preservation of proper Armenianness – what is often 
referred to as “traditional values” and implies certain type of lifestyle. Preserving proper 
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Armenianness for nationalist movements serves the purpose of preserving Armenia as a nation 
against constant existential threats (Shirinian 2016).  
 
3.2. The Velvet Revolution 
The narrative of constant existential threat and subsequent need to preserve so-called 
Armenianness has been part of Armenian political discourse – both mainstream, and far-right – 
for decades now. But the Velvet Revolution drastically changed the political life.  
 In April-May of 2018, mass protests against the ruling Republican Party of Armenia and 
its widely unpopular leader Serzh Sargsyan took place. The ruling elites were seen as deeply 
corrupt and the entire movement was aimed towards internal change. Thus the movement was 
different from similar uprisings in Georgia in Ukraine where protests resulted in changes in 
geopolitical orientation of these countries. In Armenia, foreign policy was not seriously changed: 
having the conflict with Azerbaijan, Armenian opposition leaders did not believe they could afford 
serious revision of geopolitical orientation and cause Moscow’s anger. The protests were dispersed 
in nature and took place not only in the capital city, but also in small town across the country. By 
blocking the streets and refusing to go to work or schools, small groups of people effectively 
paralyzed the entire country and forced Sargsyan to resign. The leader of the protests, long-time 
opposition figure Nikol Pashinyan, became the prime minister. Snap parliamentary elections were 
held soon, and Pashinyan-led My Step bloc received 88 of 132 seats. This is a constitutional 
majority, and My Step does not need opposition votes to make nearly any type of decision. 
 Not everyone in Armenia was protesting merely government corruption. The revolution 
formed expectations of not only economic, but also cultural changes. During one of the daily 
evening gatherings of protestors at Yerevan’s main square, future member of parliament and then 
human rights activist Maria Karapetyan spoke from the stage: “We are creating a new culture for 
ourselves, new social relations […]. I’d like to address my last, most important thought to my 
sisters […] who fought hand in hand these days both for changing the government in Armenia, 
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and for their equal rights in public space. Long live, sisters!”1. On March 8, 2019, couple of months 
after being elected prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan walked the streets of Yerevan giving flowers 
to women and asking: “What do you think about defending women’s rights in Armenia? Did you 
know that March 8 […] movement started for equal labor rights for women and men?”2. For the 
first time, the topic of gender equality was prioritized by the government and the topic of human 


















                                                             
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq1YwEEOHDU&ab_channel=Factortv  




4. THE FAR-RIGHT: WHAT IS IT?  
 
In this chapter I will discuss briefly the studies on extreme and radical right movement in Europe 
after World War II. I will concentrate on research done by Cas Mudde and Roger Griffin. I will 
also discuss studies on far-right in Armenian context and will provide a short overview of semiotic 
research on the far-right. 
 
4.1. Far-right in post-war Europe  
No matter right or left, extremist political views deal with rejection of the values and practices of 
democracy whatsoever, and radical views – whether right or left – deal with serious systemic 
changes in the existing order (March, Mudde 2005:24-25). The concept “far-right” has been widely 
used in mass media and academic literature in recent years, being often quite vaguely defined. This 
vagueness partially comes from the usage of far-right as an umbrella term for a whole spectrum of 
political parties and movements. In this text the term far-right is used to designate two types of 
political formations: extreme and radical right (Kopeček 2007:284). Both on the far-right end of 
the right-left continuum, these ideologies differ in their perception of democracy. For the extreme 
right it is characteristic to have an explicit ideological link to fascism and reject democratic state 
(Hainsworth 2008:12). The common features of the extreme right ideology are nationalism, 
xenophobia, racism, anti-democratic sentiment and support for a strong state (Hainsworth 
2008:68). Looking meticulously for all five features to classify a political formation as extreme 
right would be essentialist, rather one should pay attention to themes, issues and style to recognize 
the extreme right discourse (ibid.). What is different in radical right ideology is that these people 
are not anti-democratic per se but reject the liberal democracy: they “do not want to overthrow 
democracy, they want to weaken liberal checks on pure majoritarian rule” (Mudde 2011:7)3. What 
                                                             
3 While “far-left” can also be conceptualized as an umbrella term for extreme (that reject democracy) and radical 
(that demand crucial changes in existing political order) left, ideologically the left, obviously, differ. Far-left ideas 
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makes both these ideologies right-wing is the rejection of fundamental principles human equality. 
The extreme right emphasizes the inequality of individuals in terms of nationality, race, ethnicity, 
religion, etc. (Carter 2005:17-18). The radical right presents the self as homogeneous and the other 
as corrupt and dangerous (Mudde 2011:7), and homogeneity implies the impossibility to grant 
equal rights to deviants from the homogeneous self, for example, to minorities. For the far-right 
communities considered in this thesis the self is the nation which is represented in “ethnically 
based, exclusionary” manner (Hainsworth 2008:11). To understand the relations of the extreme 
and radical right political formations to the concept of nation one should discuss the ideology in 
the frame of which these movements have been studied for many decades: fascism.  
Roger Griffin defines fascism as a “revolutionary form of populist nationalism” (Griffin 
2000:165; Griffin 2003:41). Fascism sees the state of the nation as decadent and strives for a 
revolution as a way to the rebirth of nation in its full — and pure — glory. In the first half of the 
20th century, this ideology recorded notorious success. But after 1945, the environment in many 
parts of the world was hostile towards overt fascism making declaration of sympathy towards 
fascist regimes of the past almost a taboo. In fact, in the decades following the World War II many 
countries gradually built legal framework for prohibiting fascist parties: from banning parties as 
such to posing restrictions on their ability to participate in elections (Finn 2000) which is not 
always practiced without difficulties due to the fact that electoral rights are fundamental principle 
of democracy (Navot 2008). These developments did not eliminate fascism from societies; instead, 
it transformed itself to be able to survive in the hostile milieu. Classical mass parties were not a 
possible format for fascism to exist in (hardly could they attract any sizable support), therefore, 
they transformed into a multitude of small organized groups of militant activists without any 
formal ties to regular political parties that Griffin terms groupuscules: “The radical right planets 
of Europe’s interwar political system have broken into countless asteroids” (Griffin 2000:169). 
These processes are at the basis of contemporary far-right movements in Armenia (see more on 
groupuscular nature of Armenian far-right communities observed in this thesis in the section 6.1). 
                                                             
deal with economic inequality and stand for major redistribution of resources from elites; they see global 
structural causes of national socio-economic problems, but also advocate for international unity and solidarity 
being adepts of internationalism as opposed to nationalism (March, Mudde 2005:25).   
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4.2. Semiotic research on the far-right 
Intersection of semiotics and studies on extreme or radical right ideologies is not new. Some 
scholars used semiotic analysis of literary texts to approach the question of fascism as ideology 
(see Hartnett’s analysis of Ezra Pound’s The Cantos, 1993). Umberto Eco discussed fascism by 
outlining a list of features of what he calls “Ur-Fascism” (“Eternal Fascism”). The list is comprised 
of quite a diverse set of standpoints from cult of tradition to selective populism (Eco 1995).   
 In recent years, the number of studies which adopt semiotic approach for analyzing far-
right ideologies and groups has been growing. Madisson and Ventsel applied the concepts of Tartu-
Moscow school and cultural semiotics in a number of articles to explore extreme right meaning-
making. They combined Roger Griffin’s concept of groupuscule with Yuri Lotman’s notion of 
semiosphere to analyze groupuscules as semiospheres (2018, see below). This approach allowed 
introducing two other concepts of cultural semiotics, namely, self-description and self-model, to 
analyze how online extreme right communities identify themselves (2016b). Madisson described 
the semiotic logic of signification of conspiracy theories and used the concept of code-text to 
explain how conspiracy theories create interpretational frameworks for connecting unrelated 
events in extreme right communication (2014, 2016a). Damčević and Rodik also used the concept 
of self-description to analyze communication of Croatian right-wing communities in the 
semiosphere of Facebook. They discuss how idealized self-portraits of right-wing Facebook pages 
are built and what role textual fragments containing hate speech, such as fascist salute Za dom 
spremni, play in that process. They argue that the idea of Croatianness is central to the self-
description which is built on the opposition of self and other, and hence any element that does not 
fit this self-description is excluded (Damčević, Rodik 2018). Furthermore, Makharashvili used 
Lotman’s concepts of culture and anticulture to explore the construction of “Georgianness” and 
the opposition of self/other in the Georgian extreme right discourse (2020).  
 Rheindorf and Wodak discussed recontextualizations and resemiotizations of extreme-
right ideology in Austria. They followed the transfer of the far-right discourse into mainstream 
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discourse through a process of “semiotic reinterpretations” of far-right ideas (Rheindorf, Wodak 
2019).    
 
4.3. Armenian far-right: “figure of the homosexual” and narratives of Eurasianism 
During the last two decades, Armenian political landscape has been leaning to the right. Danielyan 
mentions that in Armenia leftist ideas were not usually translated into voting preferences, and not 
a single leftist party has been elected since 1999 (Danielyan 2014:88). Up until 2018 Velvet 
Revolution, Armenia had two authoritarian leaders, both coming from Republican Party of 
Armenia (RPA). In the last years of its rule RPA faced severe crisis of legitimacy over widespread 
corruption, economic concerns and losses in 2016 April war with Azerbaijan. Political scientist 
Mikayel Zolyan4 notes that it was then that RPA developed the quasi-ideology of “nation-army” 
which was characterized by increased use of militarist rhetoric by the government (Zolyan 
2018:98-100). Political scientist Nerses Kopalyan agrees that the policies of authoritarian 
governments in Armenia before the revolution were not shaped by ideological goals and were 
characterized by “presence of artificial ideology” (Kopalyan 2018). He writes that RPA “utilized 
the ultra-nationalism of historic hero Garegin Nzhdeh to formulate a center-right party that extolled 
security and patriotism over all other social issues” (ibid.). Therefore, it is difficult to draw neat 
ideological “borders” and put the Armenian political parties and initiatives accurately on right-left 
continuum. However, the militarism and “quasi-ideology” of RPA created a suitable context for 
emergence of far-right movements. Freedom House special report on rising Eurasian far-right 
states:  
Eurasian far-right groups have emerged in contexts distinguished by common features, including the long-
standing presence of ethnic-nationalist discourses; military conflicts that are open to exploitation by radical 
nationalist groups; and the instrumentalization of movements by domestic and international actors that see 
them as useful tools in their various political struggles (Gordon 2020:1).  
After the revolution, the far-right strongly opposed themselves to the newly formed government, 
creating a more vivid and visible movement.    
                                                             
4 Political scientists Mikayel Zolyan and Hamazasp Danielyan cited in this chapter both were elected MPs in 
December 2018. 
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 The post-revolutionary leader Nikol Pashinyan himself is characterized as a center-right 
politician (Kopalyan 2018). His My Step bloc, however, adopts a “big tent” ideology: rather than 
having one ideological axis, it unites MPs with left, centrist and right approaches. Nerses Kopalyan 
noted in an interview to me that My Step covers nearly entire political spectrum, and the only spare 
niche where one could maintain more or less successful opposition to the ruling bloc is the far-
right5. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that after the Velvet Revolution, when political leaders 
were forced to step down by mass protests, mainstream conservative parties started incorporating 
more and more of far-right standpoints. There appeared rumors about the mainstream conservative 
parties supporting far-right groups, first of all, Adekvad and Veto. While the character of that 
support remains outside of the scope of my analysis, I follow the incorporation of far-right rhetoric 
by the mainstream political parties in chapter 7.  
 Both before and after the revolution, the far-right in Armenia have been characterized by 
fixation on the topic of sexuality and queerness. Shirinian writes that Armenian right-wing 
nationalist see Armenia as part of cultural context of the East and inherently different from the 
West, whose liberalism “encroaches upon the national sovereignties” (2020:3). Armenian 
nationalists are “invested in preserving a particularly Armenian nation, they often see Armenian 
culture as sitting comfortably within a ‘Eurasian’ civilization with which it shares values and 
dispositions, and is radically different from Western civilization” (ibid.). This discourse borrows 
significantly from Russian narratives of Eurasianism.  
 Shirinian describes (2020:5) modern-day Armenian right-wing nationalists as those who 
imagine Armenia within civilizational boundaries of Eurasia and outside Europe. A lot in their 
understanding of this imagined geographical and cultural division is borrowed from Russian 
nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin. It was through Dugin’s work that the narratives about 
New World Order penetrated Russian discourse (Yablokov 2020)․ Dugin was one of the main 
thinkers promoting Eurasianism and anti-Western conspiracy theories after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, and he remained close to Kremlin up until the Ukrainian crisis in mid-2010s.  
                                                             
5 Kopalyan also noted that given that Armenian society is quite conservative, there can be no sizable far-left 
political power. The full interview in Armenian: https://anchor.fm/mediadotam/episodes/ep-ei7ac1/a-a2v6h74  
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 Shirinian points out that right-wing nationalists see the West as an imperialist power that 
imposes cultural colonization. They also see the queer and feminist communities as main actors 
promoting Western imperialistic goals in Armenia: “[…] what was a political-economic concern 
becomes trapped within discussions of cultural. The targets, thus, become LGBT and feminist 
activists rather than CEOs of mining companies, shareholders, oligarchs, and other ruling elite” 
(2020:8-9). This emphasis on culture is also why Russia is not seen by right-wing communities as 
an alien colonizing power: during the Soviet Union, Armenia along with many other Soviet 
republics, was incorporated by the state into a mutual cultural belonging space, and this legacy 
prevents the far-right from seeing Russian influence as an alien one. According to Shirinian, right-
wing nationalists “constructed the hypervisibility of the figure of the homosexual” and 
successfully used it to mobilize support. 
These nationalists were drawing on already tense feelings of political, economic and social crises in 
the nation that they congealed into this figure, making it an appealing avenue through which much of 
mainstream media can explore these anxieties. As such, many Armenians express these various feelings of 
crisis – from unemployment and underemployment, election fraud, massive emigration, economic corruption 
and so on – as forms of moral perversion (aylandakutyun) that are felt as national annihilation (Shirinian 
2016: xvii).   
After the Velvet Revolution, the far-right efforts towards constructing hypervisible “figure of the 











5. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter I will describe the concept of groupuscule in more detail. I will provide overview 
several concepts that were of key importance for this work. Most of these concepts stem from 
Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, and they were relevant for answering both research questions 
stated in this thesis. The last concept, Rick Iedema’s notion of resemiotization, was used to answer 
the second research question. 
 
5.1. The concept of groupuscule 
Griffin defines groupuscules as small political entities “formed to pursue palingenetic (i.e. 
revolutionary) ideological, organizational or activist ends with an ultimate goal of overcoming the 
decadence of the existing liberal democratic system” (2003:30). Groupuscules are autonomous 
organizations but have very few active members and there can be turnover in membership. Leaning 
towards political extremism, they usually have minimal public visibility or support. However, they 
have a potential to influence political life through their ability to easily establish connections with 
other groupuscules which are “sufficiently aligned ideologically and tactically to complement each 
other’s activities in their bid to institute a new type of society” (ibid.). Griffin states that 
groupuscules reinforce each other and acquire characteristics of rhizome. He borrows Deleuze and 
Guattari concept for acentered non nonhierarchical. Thus, groupuscular right are characterized by 
Griffin as non-hierarchical and centerless movements with fluid boundaries which establish 
networks — whether formal or informal — both on national and international level (Griffin 2000). 
Rhizomatic structure makes groupuscular right virtually immune to control by democratic 
institutions (Griffin 2003:46). 
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 Lewis (2018) recorded mutual appearances and joint interviews of English-speaking alt-
right YouTubers and performed network analysis of this data; her visualizations allow picturing 
the structure similar to groupuscular rhizome. However, some nodes on her visualization are bigger 
than others, which means they have more connections, references and hence more importance in 
the network. This illustrates the problem with Griffin’s model which was pointed out by Madisson 
and Ventsel (2018) who criticize the model for depicting only the “ideal hypertextual system” 
where there’s no place for the interpreter. They point out that by attributing rhizomatic 
characteristics to groupuscular network Griffin ends up applying technical features of the Internet 
on the groupuscular right. But on practice once an interpreter is introduced to this model, the 
information is “organized by core ideas and values that are dominant on the horizon of 
interpretation of a particular reader/viewer” (Madisson, Ventsel 2018:8). This means that an ideal 
rhizomatic structure with no hierarchy is not practically possible: a given interpreter will be more 
receptive to the type of information either confirming her previous beliefs or coming from an 
authoritative source. While agreeing that groupuscules have less rigid hierarchies than extreme 
right parties, Madisson and Ventsel stress that in a system with an interpreter there will appear 
“meaning-hierarchies” (2018:9). Authors propose Lotman’s concept of semiosphere as a more 
accurate model to explain groupuscular right as a meaning-making system. Distinguishing 
individual semiotic units and describing interaction of core and the periphery of the system, 
semiosphere allows the explain complex connectivity of the groupuscular right and the hierarchical 
relations this system, unlike rhizome, has (2018:11-13). I was able to see this hierarchical structure 
in Armenian groupuscular right. In fact, my choice of social media profiles to observe for this 
thesis was dictated by the fact that Narek Malian, Vahagn Chakhalyan, Hayk Ayvazyan and Arthur 
Danielyan not only pose themselves as leaders of their respective groupuscules but are also 
accepted as such by the members. Although there is often no formalized distribution of positions 
within their organizations, these people are opinion-leaders, their Facebook posts and interviews 
tend to be widely shared and commented in the groupuscular network. Furthermore, Malian and 
Danielyan are treated as important figures within the groupuscular right due to their previous 
closeness to the powerholders and personal connections in mainstream media field: they are seen 
as activists able to grab the attention of the general public.   
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It should be noted that groupuscules are not necessarily extreme right but can also be on 
the left end of political continuum (Bale 2002, Mathyl 2002) and their ideology itself can be less 
rigid than that of traditional political parties (Coogan 2002:12). Bale notes that formation of 
groupuscules allows individuals and groups to “maintain internal social solidarity and sustain 
ideological purity in a hostile social environment” (2002:25).  
 
5.2. Tartu-Moscow school and semiotics of culture 
Culture has been defined in multiple different ways across disciplines. The current thesis uses the 
definitions of culture provided by scholars of Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, specifically 
Yuri Lotman and his co-author Boris Uspensky. Along with the concept of culture, I use two other 
key concepts of Yuri Lotman’s scholarship: semiosphere and self-description. 
 
5.2.1. Culture 
Since 1960s, Lotman defined culture as “the sum of non-hereditary information” (1967:30) which 
people collect, store and transmit further. Even items of material culture, such as tools of 
production, always have two functions. On one hand they serve mostly as practical necessity, 
especially for contemporaries. On the other hand, they carry in themselves the experience of past 
labor activities, and therefore serve as means for storing and transmitting information. This second 
function is especially relevant for descendants: Lotman explains that an archeologist, for example, 
has little practical need in antient items of material culture, but can extract valuable information 
from them.  
 In 1970s, Lotman, together with Boris Uspensky, developed this idea and defined culture 
as “non-hereditary memory of the community” (1978:213). More precisely, culture is “a record in 
the memory of what the community has experienced” (1978:214), therefore it is always connected 
to past experience and is perceived not at the moment of its creation, but always post factum. This 
memory operates by as a system of semiotic rules which allows human experience to be 
transformed into culture and then get stored, redistributed or “forgotten” among the myriads of 
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texts created by a human collective. Hence, texts from cultural memory can serve as resources for 
building self-descriptions — and eradicating phenomena not recorded in the memory of the 
collective. This is how self-models, i.e. meta-level idealized image that a human collective draws 
of itself, are built.  
 For any act of communications to happen, individual participants need to be different, i.e. 
possess different information. Lotman states, that if one possessed the totality of all information, 
communication would be meaningless. Therefore, any system develops towards more complexity 
and more uniqueness of individual participants of communication, which also makes 
communication more difficult (Lotman 1978:17). Culture exists to overcome this difficulty: it is 
the meta-level structure, a “supra-individual intellect” which unites different individuals.  
 For Lotman, these two definitions of culture (as a “supra-individual intellect” and “non-
hereditary memory of the community”) are not in contradiction. In fact, they are logical 
continuation of each other. Upon defining culture as “collective intellect and collective memory” 
in the short article “Memory in from culturological perspective” (“Память в культурологическом 
освещении”), Lotman continues specifying that culture is a “supra-individual mechanism for 
storing and transmitting certain messages (texts) and developing new ones” (1992:200). That is, 
culture is a meta-level structure where texts can be preserved (memorized) and made irrelevant 
(forgotten) or relevant (remembered) in different époques.  
 
5.2.2. Culture: self and other 
Before the theory of semiosphere appeared in 1980s, Lotman already had a model of cultural space 
divided into self and other — a much more rigid division in which the self constructs otherness as 
a space of chaos, the realm of non-culture; if the self is organized, the other lacks any form of 
organization (Lotman 1975). To illustrate this idea Lotman brings the example of antiquity which 
saw barbarians as unorganized, uncivilized other, despite the fact that the label “barbarian” unites 
a multitude of collectives some of which had way more ancient culture (Lotman 1975։97, 
2005:212). Any culture is defined only as an area separated from the non-culture, wherein non-
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culture can be manifested in not sharing a certain way of life or behavior (Lotman, Uspensky 
1978:211).  
Culture is understood only as a section, a closed-off area against the background of nonculture. The nature 
of this opposition may vary: nonculture may appear as not belonging to a particular religion, not having 
access to some knowledge, or not sharing in some type of life and behavior (ibid).  
In the texts by far-right groups and conservative political parties I observed for this thesis, 
attribution of individuals to external nonculture is usually done by accusing them of not sharing 
traditional values. The concept of Armenian traditional values is ill-defined and vague but allows 
to exclude individuals who deviate from the traditional gender norms, i.e. do not share “some type 
of life and behavior”.  
 
5.2.3. Semiosphere 
The distinction between culture as “internal organization” and other spheres as its “external 
disorganization” is one of the core dichotomies of Lotmanian scholarship. Is it strongly connected 
(Salupere 2017:78) to another important dichotomy: the opposition of semiotic and 
nonsemiotic/extrasemiotic spaces. Semiosphere – a concept proposed by Lotman in analogy with 
Vernandsky’s biosphere – is the semiotic space, i.e. a space where meaning-making is made 
possible. Outside of semiosphere lies the nonsemiotic/extrasemiotic space, which however should 
not be understood as a space where there is no semiosis. Lotman specifies: “'Extracultural' sphere 
often appears to be the sphere of others’ culture, and extrasemiotic sphere – the sphere of others’ 
semiotics” (cited in: Salupere 2017:78).  
 The space of semioshere is an abstract one, but it is nevertheless a specific sphere 
possessing characteristics “assigned to the enclosed space” (Lotman 2005:207). It is characterized 
by several attributes. First, semiosphere has a boundary which isolates it from external spheres. 
This boundary is “represented by the sum of bilingual translatable “filters”, passing through which 
the text is translated into another language (or languages), situated outside the given semiosphere” 
(Lotman 2005:208-209). Semioshere cannot contact external texts; for that to happen external texts 
need to be translated in one of the internal languages of a semiosphere (i.e. semioticized). The 
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boundary points act as “sensory receptors” which perceive external stimuli and translate them into 
a language which is perceivable for internal nervous system (ibid). The boundary has a function 
to separates semiosphere (by marking their borders) and simultaneously to connect them (by 
performing translation between them).  
 Second attribute of the semiosphere is irregularity. It is characterized by internal dynamic 
processes which means that the space of semiosphere is not homogeneous, it has core (often not 
one but many nucleuses) and periphery. The core hosts dominant semiotic systems. One of many 
nucleuses may rise to the level of self-description and thus produce meta-language describing the 
entire semiosphere. In this case a level of ideal unity is build on the real irregular semiotic map 
(Lotman 2005:213-214).  Structures in the core are organized rigidly while periphery is “less 
organised and more flexible” (2005:214). Peripheral structures which are not described 
(description is a form of structuring, Lotman 1978:22) or are described with inadequate 
metalanguage develop more quickly. Over time the core can be pushed to the periphery, and 
periphery can become the new core.    
 
5.2.4. Self-description 
The concept of self-description was borrowed by Juri Lotman from cybernetics where it is 
understood as a form of self-organization of a system, defining system against the environment 
and a mechanism for organizing communication (Madisson 2016b:205-206).  Lotman viewed self-
description as a form of self-organization of a semiotic system. Self-description increases the 
rigidity of the structure and slows down its development (that is why periphery of semiosphere 
develops faster than the rigidly organized core). Self-description creates an “idealized self-portrait 
of a culture”; it’s a process of “secondary structuring” which, by contributing to more standardized 
and rigid organization, results in elimination of “wrong” texts from the cultural memory and 
canonization of “correct” text. Thus, a simplified model of historical process is being created and 
declared as normative (Lotman 1977:142-144). In extreme cases these metasystems may become 
so rigid that they nearly loose ability to connect to the real semiotics system that they claim to 
describe. Lotman points out that even in such cases “the authority of 'correctness' and 'real 
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existence' remains with [them], and the real layers of social semiosis in these conditions are 
transfered completely into the rhelm of 'wrong' and 'non-existent'” (1978:22). These can include 
not only individual texts, but “whole layers of cultural phenomena” (Madisson 2016b:207). Self-
description can create a self-model or self-modelling texts of the culture which help to “identify 
certain dominants in it, on the basis of which a unified system is built, which should serve as a 
code for self-knowledge [самопознания] and self-decoding of the texts of the given culture” 
(Lotman 1971:170).  
The aforementioned concepts borrowed from Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics 
(culture/cultural memory, self and other, self-description, semiosphere) are closely connected to 
each other. In this thesis they are used to analyze how the queer community is denied belonging 
to the nation; they are depicted as not correcponding to correct self-description. Queerness is at 
the perifery, at bilingual/polylingual border of the semiosphere thus carrying the mixture of inner 
culture and outer sphere on disorder and chaos.  
 
5.3. Resemiotization 
Rick Iedema proposed the concept of resemiotization to describe how meaning is changed in 
different contexts. Resemiotization is a process, a “stream of events/flow of object” that moves 
from temporal kinds of meaning-making, such as talk or gesture, to more durable kinds, such as 
printed reports, material objects etc. (Iedema 2001:23-24). As this process unfolds, certain 
metamorphosis take place: meanings get into more specialized discourses and obtain more 
resistant materiality. This is an intersemiotic process, and Iedema’s writing stems from Jakobson’s 
research on intersemioticity (see, for example, Jakobson 1966).   
Iedema brings several examples of resemiotization (2001, 2003). One example is a series 
of events – from a meeting between a client and architect to creation of a plan and construction 
process – that happen for a building to be built. The first meeting is resemioticized into meeting 
minutes, then into printed reports, then into a plan and a model, and eventually, into a material 
object of a building. That is, a temporal kind of meaning-making, a talk, is eventually 
recemioticized into a more resistant materiality, a building. Another example is recontextualization 
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of a teachers first interaction with a child, then acquisition of a test result, and, finally, creation of 
a written report. Each step in this sequence of events serves as a basis of interaction at the next 
step being also “institutionally isolated from the interaction practices that generated them in the 
preceding events” (Mehan 1993, cited in Iedema 2001:25). The recontextualization of, for 
example, a talk into a more durable mode also makes the meaning in the next step less negotiable 
(ibid.). The process moves “towards increasingly durable semiotic manifestations, while at the 
same time increasingly distancing itself from ‘the social interaction that created it’”. It is important 
to note that transition to each next step in in this process also creates discrepancies, and 
resemiotization never produces exact likeness (Iedema 2001:32-33). 
As I already mentioned, Rheindorf and Wodak used the concept of resemiotization to 
analyze the travelling of far-right discourses into the mainstream, thus resulting in normalization 
of the far-right discourse (2019). Similarly, in this thesis the notion of resemiotization is used to 
follow the process of transformation of the far-right ‘talk’ into a less negotiable, more ‘durable’ 


















In this section I discuss the ideological stances of the far-right in post-revolutionary Armenia and 
discuss their structural organization and activities using the concept of groupuscule. I will provide 
an overview of main activities of the groupuscular right as those are manifested in Armenian 
context. Then, I will analyze how the groupuscular right construct otherness using hostile claims 
against queer community and portray the post-revolutionary political elites as part and parcel of 
the alien other.  
 
6.1. Groupuscular right in post-revolutionary Armenia 
As already mentioned, groupuscules are far-right, neo-fascist formations (never well-established 
political parties). These are formations comprise a network-like structure with a small, often 
inconsistent membership. All these features are present in the far-right communities I observed.    
Among the groupuscular right as a network of small political formations where fascism 
survived in the post-war period, overt support for the Nazi regime or declarations of sympathy 
towards führer are generally avoided (although I have seen occasional memes sympathizing Hitler 
shared by Adekvad members). However, one could still recognize in these communities the 
characteristic ideas of fascism (although in various degrees of intensity): the nostalgia for idealized 
past, complaints about the decadence of the nation, calls for revolution to overcome that decadence 
and rejection of egalitarianism and democratic order per se. One of the four political formations I 
discuss in this thesis, Adekvad, is a vivid example of neo-fascist ideology. In September 2019, 
Adekvad formally registered as a party. In his speech on that occasion Adekvad’s leader Artur 
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Danielyan stated that they are just another fake, decorative party, because the entire political 
system of Armenia has been just a theater6.  
“I am convinced that the new world revolution is inevitable, it will happen regardless of anything, both in 
China, where the theater is minimized, and in America, where there is an overdose of theater. It is our desire 
that the revolution begins in Armenia, and there are preconditions for that. I repeat: revolution will happen”7.   
The Velvet Revolution which happened in Armenia in 2018 Danielyan saw as fake and 
orchestrated “revolt of the idiots”. Praising the authoritarian regimes of China and Iran, he 
predicted the creation of meritocracies which will come to replace democracies and that the 
victorious march against political theater of democracy will start in Armenia (from the same 
speech):  
No matter how much external forces label us and divide us [...] we are homogeneous, much more 
homogeneous than any European country. I would even argue that we are one of the most homogeneous 
countries in the world. And therefore, we have the capacity to lead the [world] revolution ideologically. [...] 
Humanity, the human soul will be saved as a result of a process which will start in Armenia.  
Adekvad is the only groupuscule that registered itself as a political party. However, at the very 
registration event and ever since that, the members call themselves not a “party” but a 
“congregation”. The manifesto published on their website draws an idealized picture of early years 
of independent Armenia when there was a chance, albeit lost, to establish its domination in the 
region; the text calls for embracing the need to “accept the battle” and fight for that domination. 
Aside from revolutionary sentiment, Adekvad also sees equality as a possible option among 
animals, but in human society, where there is culture, equality is not possible. As we can see, 
ideologically Adekvad is an extreme right organization with quite clearly visible fascist 
worldview. But in terms of political style (Kopeček 2007:286) it resembles another kind of post-
war rightism, namely, the populist radical right.  
Populist radical right are not, strictly speaking, fascist because they do not strive to 
overthrow democratic order and do not explicitly call for revolution and rebirth. As mentioned 
above, the radical right embraces democracy but considers only one group of people full members 
                                                             
6 The creation of Adekvad party, Danielyan explained, was needed as a political instrument to cooperate 
with international partners. 
7  https://youtu.be/XIJ7SiWZZ48?t=1178 
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of society. However, Griffin notes that “axiomatic denial of the universality of human rights 
predisposes it to behave against ethnic outgroups as violently as a fascist regime” (Griffin 
2000:173). Being a “hybrid of ideological extremism and democratic constitutionalism” (ibid.), 
populist radical right is well adapted to the post-war world hostile to fascism. They fear first of all 
globalization as a process able to destroy identities and tradition, and the “purity of race” in the 
radical right discourse becomes the “purity of culture”. Thus the radical right present “reformist 
version of the same basic [fascist] myth” (Griffin 2000:174). 
Kamq, Liberation Movement and Veto are all examples of populist radical right. On its 
website Kamq, fully titled as Kamq Social Initiative for Protection of Armenian Values, states: 
“For their personal and clan interests elites in Armenia have sacrificed the country’s economy to 
the aims of globalist capital”8. Then, Veto describes itself as a social-political movement created 
to fight the “Soros agent network” which finances anti-national and anti-statehood activities in 
order to “ruin foundations of our statehood, to destroy the anchors of value system.9” Finally, 
Liberation Movement has not issued any form of a self-descriptive statement, its Facebook page 
simply states “Protect Nation, Faith, Fatherland and Family”10, and its activities are mainly 
concentrated on fighting the queer community as a deviant force undermining the national and 
religious homogeneity, and thus, strength. All three of these organizations gather for protests and 
actions and use the rhetoric of rights and freedom of speech (see more on far-right adopting 
multiculturalist discourse in Madisson, Ventsel 2016b). And all of them (including Adekvad) 
target queer community: in the narratives deployed by the far-right in Armenia the queer 
community plays a central role of the antagonist. And I will show further on in this chapter that 
this became one of the main mechanisms for combating the new government which is perceived 
as liberal and accused of supporting the queers.  
There is no reliable data available about the memberships of these organizations. However, 
my observation of activity at their social media pages and during their protests shows that they 
have limited number of members. When talking about groupuscular right I use the words 
                                                             




“member” and “ally” interchangeably as groupuscules do not have any formal membership or, at 
least, do not publish any such data. Instead, supporters’ base actively changes in almost all 
groupuscules, and the groupuscular right remain constantly mutating (Griffin 2003:44). So, while 
several key figures remain the same in the groupuscules, the larger network of supporters reveals 
active flow of people: “lone wolf” activists come and go, members change groups, and some 
people are active in several groups simultaneously. Some groupuscules, like Liberation 
Movement, do not organize protests alone, but some activist from this organization frequently join 
protests organized by others. Kamq also couples with other groupuscules and activists. Veto and 
Adekvad have more supporters which is partially explained by their alleged or known connections 
among former political elites. Despite the small size and amorphousness of the structure 
groupuscular protests or other activities (such as social media posts and campaigns) do not remain 
unnoticed, on the contrary, they receive disproportionately big coverage in the press. However, 
one should be skeptical about the presence of far-right activists in the press: while Armenia made 
significant progress in the World Press Freedom Index11, the media outlets remain in severe 
dependence from owners most of whom are not business personas but politicians and political 
parties. The access the groupuscular right receive to the top media channels in the country is not 
conditioned by their size or relevance for the public interest but by the corporate interests of the 
media organizations, as well as the scandalous nature of their claims. Thus the frequent high 
visibility of far-right activists in the press is largely amplified, and it is not clear if this visibility 
transforms into support for their ideas among the general public.  
Furthermore, the Internet allows not only creation of websites and social media pages by 
groupuscules, but also, due to affordability, creation and maintenance of small, partisan platforms 
positioning themselves as news outlets. Thus, during my observation I encountered two Russian 
websites promoting radical right content and frequently interviewing activists from the 
groupuscules I observed, namely, Adekvad, Veto, Liberation Movement and Kamq12. 
Furthermore, Livenews.am website, which was founded by Garnik Isagulyan, former security 
                                                             
11 ttps://rsf.org/en/armenia 
12 The websites are: News-front.info, which broadcast from Crimea and praises Russian annexation of the 
peninsula, and Rossaprimavera.ru, founded by Russian nationalist Sergey Kurginyan (of Armenian descent). 
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advisor to seconds President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan, became the main host of various 
radical right activists; journalists of Livenews.am attend the protests organized by the groupuscules 
not only as journalists, but also as participants.     
 I should note that relations of media outlets and far-right groups are not addressed in this 
thesis as it is a multi-layer problem which deserves separate consideration in further research.   
 
6.2. The main activities of the groupuscular right 
Groupuscules unite in them three types of activities: ideological, coordinational and protesting 
(Griffin 2003:42). Individual groupuscules may be concentrated on some types of these activities 
more than on others, but usually blend all three. I will elaborate each of these activities in a bit 
more detail as they are manifested in Armenian groupuscular right.  
Ideological activities concern reaching out to the public by spreading ideological 
information. Adekvad is more concentrated on elaborating and disseminating ideology than other 
groupuscules. Its leader, Arthur Danielyan, writes in length to explain his view on history, 
philosophy and politics, as well as discusses conditions for building a great statehood. Adekvad’s 
online series called Killing Poghos featured member Konstantin Ter-Nakalyan, head of a large 
online news aggregator Blognews.am, giving a speech to a younger member of the group about 
Christianity being the key to the past greatness of Armenia: “Our national rebirth is impossible 
without going back to our religious cultural roots and putting those on modern engine”13. Such 
speeches by members are not rare, and they are typical for the extreme right ideology (Griffin 
1999:39). During the period of my observation, some Adekvad members, including Danielyan, 
were not in Yerevan: they had acquired a village house in Artsakh, a territory of dispute between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and were renovating the house and planning the reopening of a collective 
farm which existed here in Soviet times. The members were praising the village life and discussing 
the rebuilding of past prosperity and greatness both through economic means (by reopening of the 
collective farm) and by ideological means (rebuilding the abandoned church and uniting with the 
                                                             
13 https://www.facebook.com/adekvadism/videos/2291920604431929/ 
 41 
local high-ranked priests to bring the statehood and religion back together). Despite the 
“congregation” favors ideological elaboration over other forms of activities, it still engages in real-
life protests and is tied by various connections to other groupuscules․   
Coordination and linkage with other far-right formations is a necessary characteristic of 
the groupuscular network. As mentioned before, these ties may be of various character: 
membership, joint protests and campaigns, joint interviews and guest appearances in each others’ 
videos, etc. Groupuscules with less resources to produce video content and who are covered less 
frequently by major news organizations (Kamq, Liberation Movement) often share content from 
groupuscules whose leaders have the means and access to newsrooms (Adekvad, Veto). An 
example of mutual appearance is November 1st protest against Istanbul Convention where Veto 
and Liberation Movement representatives gave speeches, and the campaign #sutnikol 
(#lyingNikol, reference to PM Nikol Pashinyan) which Liberation Movement, Veto and Adekvad 
members all joined to via either Facebook profile picture frames or participation in real-live act of 
protest. One should also mention adoption of narratives and frameworks proposed by other 
groupuscules. So, Istanbul Convention, which is the central topic of Kamq activities, was first 
criticized by Hayk Ayvazyan from Liberation Movement. All groupuscules I observed adopted the 
same claims about the “real” aims of the document, and members of all groupuscules used 
Facebook frames “No to Istanbul” and “No to Istanbul Convention ratification”. Furthermore, 
Kamq concentrated nearly all its activities around fighting the Istanbul Convention.  
Protesting. Griffin distinguishes groupuscular right extra-parliamentary social movements 
from regular grassroots activism, such as the civil rights movement (Griffin 2003:32-33). This 
distinction is also made by other researchers (Madisson, Ventsel 2018:13). During the time of my 
observation the groupuscular right engaged in different acts of protests ranging from peaceful 
demonstrations and petition signing to physical attacks. During protests it is also easy to observe 
the myriad of links connecting the groupuscular right. For example, in November all of the 
groupuscules I observed joined the protests against reforms in university curriculum organized by 
mainstream party ARF and appeared in a number of other protests together. Another example is 
Kamq and Liberation Movement allies together attacking and disturbing a modern dance 
performance on November 2 on the grounds of the event being “satanist” and the performers 
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“perverting” their homeland. On the next day, Kamq performed frankincense burning ritual and 
prayer at the place of the dance. Veto, in its turn, declared the dance performance an event funded 
by Soros and organized a mocking political performance at the same place on November 6. Every 
protest organized by groupuscules was widely covered in the media. In fact, protest served 
primarily for catching media attention and amplifying importance of the event as groupuscules are 
usually unable to gather big crowds. Many online and TV news outlets covered live these protests 
no matter how small the number of participants was; no fact-checking was provided for the claims 
made during the protests. It’s worth mentioning another specificity of Armenian media field which 
helps groupuscules get coverage. Due to the revolution itself, and many other mass movements 
before it, a strong tradition of street protest broadcasting was established in the media, although 
unlike online media, the TV channels, previously censored by the regime, adopted the practice 
only recently.   
In summary, all groupuscules I observed are connected to each other through various 
linkages and engage in ideological dissemination and acts of protests. And although some 
groupuscules engage more in some activities than another, they usually present a blend of all three 
types of activities.  
In the online environment, the affordances of hypermedia are used in full by the 
groupuscular right (Madisson, Ventsel 2018:7): the communication is complex and multimodal; 
two of four groupuscules produce their own video content. The groups I observed focus on 
homophobic claims, ideas of religious and cultural purism, ethno-religious nationalism. They are 
in strong opposition to the government (Liberation Movement existed before the revolution and 
was critical of the government at the time, other groupuscules were formed as opposition to the 
new government) and advocate rebirth of once powerful Armenian nation and state, however it is 
not specified which historical period they refer to: the strength from the past remains mythical. It 
is common to use the language of war, be it emotionally charged chants (“Good morning, dear 
Armenians, our triumphal march continues, join us!”14) or terminological, formal language (“The 
processes organized against Armenia are value-aggression and intervention. This is a war and our 
                                                             
14  This is the post Kamq leader Vahagn Chakhalyan made every morning in November. 
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response will be adequate.”15). Activists claim that Armenian nation is at war, and they are the 
fighters who are going to make sacrifices, but because their fight is for good, they are inevitably 
going to win. The characteristics of the enemy in that war may differ in different groupuscules, 
but it is usually some powerful evil force from culturally alien and decadent West.   
The communication of the extreme and radical right (especially members of Kamq, Veto 
and Adekvad) was also marked by skillful usage of visual symbols. Fashioned after American alt-
right, Adekvad, Veto and Kamq are branded thoroughly: they have logos, branded clothing, 
accessories, stickers, cups and other matter, and their leaders maintain respective styles. Veto’s 
Narek Malian often poses with cigars in the manner of American white supremacist Richard 
Spencer. Cigars are just one symbol the group uses to build the image of masculinity — something 
they believe to be in sharp contrast with their usual target — the queer community. Other such 
symbols are borrowed from biker subculture: for example, Veto joined #տղա_եղեք (#Be_man), 
a social media campaign and motorcycle rally organized in protest to Istanbul Convention 
ratification together with another groupuscule, Dark Ravens.   
 
6.3. Conspiracy theories as mechanism of far-right meaning making 
 Armenian culture leans towards mythological thinking. For a long period of time the intellectual 
and political elites have cultivated symbols and narratives about thousands-years-old culture, one 
of the “cradles of civilization”. This eventually led to valuing of the mythological rather than 
chronological age: while Yerevan is proud of the ruins of fortress from VII century BC, almost all 
19th-century and part of Soviet-era architecture has been demolished (either deliberately, or due 
to corruption and poor regulations) and replaced by chaotic urban development. Authoritarian 
regime of the RPA promoted “highly mythologized schemes of history” and was “accompanied 
by an ossifying of the mechanism of the collective memory and by an increasing tendency to 
contract [the volume of collective memory]” (Lotman, Uspensky 1978:217). 
                                                             
15 Citation from a speech by Liberation Movement member Hayk 
Ayvazyan  https://www.facebook.com/hayk.ayvazyan77/videos/2388733561236858/ 
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In the context of far-right discourse this general inclination towards mythological thinking 
manifested itself in widespread conspirological narratives. Conspiracy theory is a narrative 
constructed with the help of a code text (Madisson 2014; Madisson, Ventsel 2018:14-15). Code-
text is a concept proposed by Lotman as an “intermediate link between language and text” 
characteristic for cultures with mythological orientation (Lotman 1988:35). Code-text is a text, 
“syntactically constructed whole” rather than a set of rules for constructing a text (ibid.). It may 
have no real-world textual manifestation and exist only unconsciously in storyteller’s mind 
“organizing his memory and suggesting to him the limits of possible variations of a text” (ibid.). 
Madisson and Ventsel explain: “code-text is an invariant system of relations which originate from 
the collective memory of a particular community and the main role of code-text is to put particular 
pieces of information into habitual templates of meaning” (2018:15). Code-text helps to organize 
the flow of information into the ready-made interpretational framework, i.e. connects various, 
often unrelated pieces of information into a conspiracy theory. In what follows I discuss two most 
popular conspiracy theories among the groupuscular right in Armenia, namely, those about George 
Soros and Istanbul Convention.  
 
6.3.1. George Soros: enemy of the nation 
Even though significant changes in political and social life brought by Velvet Revolution were a 
response to popular demand, they also created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the future. 
Lotman pointed out that “in various historical situations, the psychosis of mass fear gives rise to 
the recognizable pattern of ‘the mythology of danger.’ There arises the notion of some tightly knit, 
secret group, plotting against society” (Lotman 1991:792). Lotman discussed here the aftermath 
of periods of rapid technological progress, but one can apply this to any instant big change, such 
as revolution. In post-revolutionary Armenia conspiracy theories about how the new government 
really came to power, hidden forces supporting it and dangers the new elites bring with them 
became part of the radical right discourse. These narratives are highly “visible” in media sphere, 
in part due to the fact that numerous media outlets are owned by representatives of former 
governments and their associates. Veto led by PR specialist Narek Malian is one of the most vivid 
examples. It is concentrated on fighting the liberal billionaire George Soros and his “agents 
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network” in Armenia. Soros is depicted as a powerful foreign force with secret evil intentions, and 
Veto declared its mission to reveal those intentions and fight the powerful villain. Soros’s activities 
in Armenia are managed by the local branch of Open Society Foundations (OSF), part of a large 
network the billionaire has established all over the world. Veto spreads the conspiracy theory about 
Soros both online through social media and news outlets and offline through protests and political 
actions. They use the conspiracy theory to, on one hand, connect events and people to malicious 
conspirers, and, on the other hand, provide strategic framing (Zald 1996:262) for social and 
political changes happening in the country.    
 It should be noted that the conspiracy theory about Soros was not generated as a folk 
narrative but was specifically developed by campaign advisors of Victor Orban for 2014 
Hungarian parliamentary election16. Interestingly, one could see in the theory itself how the 
existence of a known and named enemy puts it accurately in the frames of Schmittian definition 
of the political (Schmitt 2007). This conspiracy theory was created as a political tool and is used 
as such. Governments in Hungary, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan all used it to construct an enemy; 
all three countries banned Soros-funded Open Society Foundations after a large-scale media 
campaign against it. In Armenia the governments for many years were eager to use the money 
provided by OSF and did not disturb their work. It is Malian, the “number one political advisor in 
the country17” as he presents himself, who is most consistent in his usage of the conspiracy theory. 
He and his organization adapt to Armenian realia the original narrative about a powerful American 
billionaire using his wealth and influence to destroy the local culture and statehood. Malian and 
his organization use this narrative to combat the new political elites. Veto website describes the 
organization’s aim as “fighting against Soros agent network operating in the state”.  
Soros’ agent network, in the face of “Open Society Foundations”, has recruited and funded people with 
antinational and anti-state mentality; thus, forming a foreign agent network. This syndicate has spared no 
money and efforts to make heroes out of murderers and felons, to disgrace state pillars consistently: legal 
and educational systems, armed forces, the army included, the Armenian Apostolic Church. The aim is to 
ruin foundations of our statehood, to destroy the anchors of value system18. 
                                                             
16 See BuzzFeed investigation on the topic: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hnsgrassegger/george-soros-
conspiracy-finkelstein-birnbaum-orban-netanyahu 
17 Malian uses the Russian term polittekhnolog (политтехнолог) which refers to a range of occupations from 
campaign manager to PR specialist. 
18 https://veto.am/en/about 
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Madisson and Ventsel discuss the two ways in which the enemy is communicated in conspiracy 
theories: enemy as non-own or anti-own (Madisson 2014: 282-284, Madisson, Ventsel 2020). 
Madisson derives her classification from cultural semiotics metalanguage. Non-own enemy comes 
from the chaotic, non-structured outer sphere of the culture which, according to Lotman, every 
culture constructs for itself (Lotman, Uspensky 1978, Lotman 1975). The anti-own enemy comes 
from the negative structure within a positive, right culture. Anti-own enemy is perceived as a 
highly organized network with significant power. Usually, non-own and anti-own types of enemies 
coexist in conspiracy theories (Madisson 2014:286).  
Veto constructs a narrative where George Soros and his “agents” are the antagonists who 
combine characteristics of both types of enemies. On the one hand, Soros himself is a foreigner, 
he comes from outside, from the culture which is portrayed as a culture of perversion where 
unnatural practices destroyed traditional rules and norms (I will discuss in further pages the 
mechanism used to communicate this chaos of outer culture). Despite Soros being a concrete 
person, little is said about him or his work. His image is vague and unspecific, he is presented as 
almighty evil but concrete motivations behind his actions remain unclarified. The message remains 
that a powerful Western billionaire wants to destroy Armenian culture.   
On the other hand, however, Soros is presented as the head of “agent network [that has] 
recruited and funded people with antinational and anti-state mentality”. This network is composed 
of people from within the culture, they are the negative structure, the anti-culture. Veto refers to 
them as “bastards of Soros” and calls so not only the employees of OSF, but also those who have 
received funding from OSF or just civil society and human rights defenders. These people are 
presented as malicious forces secretly weakening the state and culture from inside; they are called 
“betrayers” who sold themselves and adopted foreign values. An announcement on Veto website 
promises that “Veto will stick the label of a traitor on all those agents’ foreheads.19”  
It is common for conspiracy theorists to use logic of signification characteristic for 
scientific discourse (Madisson 2014:292). That is, they try to present evidence to support their 
                                                             
19 https://veto.am/en/page/soros-office-armenia 
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claims and use generalisations. Furthermore, far-right often self-describe as citizen journalists 
(Madisson, Ventsel 2018:13) Similarly, I observed that Veto frequently uses the style of 
journalistic investigations: they present evidence in forms of photos, screenshots, documents, as 
well as claim they reveal hidden and publicly relevant information. For example, when it was 
announced that first crematoriums might be opened in Armenia soon, Narek Malian published a 
post on Facebook claiming that “the artificial agenda on crematoriums is a process fully directed 
by Soros’ office, which began years ago20”. As proof he presented the fact that in 2013 OSF funded 
then university professor and now parliamentarian Hovhannes Hovhannisyan’s research on 
crematoriums. Malian’s text used an official language: “I hereby inform that there is a fierce fight 
against national traditions and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church through this kind of 
campaigns sponsored by Soros’ office”. Along with his verbal message, Malian provided 
screenshots from the Hovhannisyan’s paper.  
The practice of using screenshots from OSF website (OSF provides open access to 
information about the grants of the organization) as proof of ties of different actors with OSF is a 
popular practice among Armenian far-right activists. Although those screenshots do not really 
support the claims made by conspiracy theory proponents, because references in conspiracy 
theories are necessarily vague (Madisson 2014: 294-296), they have the potential of creating an 
image of factuality and credibility. This potential is derived from screenshot being an indexical 
sign which, like photographs, is bound to reality by the physical act of its creation (Pierce 1985:11). 
Malian’s Facebook post about crematoriums got republished in full and without fact checking by 
13 news outlets, including the most visited news website in the country, News.am (which has been 
accused of hiding the real owner, allegedly a top official in the former government).  
In general, Madisson distinguishes two types of signification logic in conspiracy theories: 
mythological and descriptive. Mythological signification allows to transform the current events so 
that certain symbols from cultural memory can be recognized in them. For example, Malian 
declared on two occasions Veto’s fight against Soros as “the new Vardananq”, referring to the 5th-
century heroic battle against Persia where Armenians fought bravely despite significantly smaller 
                                                             
20 https://www.facebook.com/narek.malyan/posts/3031616620199882 
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army. Descriptive logic of significations in conspiracy theories present the conspirators as an 
extremely organized group with complex structure able to penetrate all aspects and institutions of 
a given society. This allows creating the feeling of danger (Lotman 1991:792) and drawing a 
picture of a binary world divided into friends and enemies, where everything is connected to 
everything else (Madisson 2014:290). Thus, all the scandals that happened in November 2019 
were tied by Malian and other Veto members to the Soros’ agents network. They protested the 
Istanbul Convention and reforms in university curriculum, criticized the movie about a transgender 
athlete and huZANQ uZANG modern dance performance with one and the same message: it was 
Soros’ fund that was the real organizer of all this events, and the motivation for that was to destroy 
the statehood and social order.  
One of the dancers in huZANQ uZANG performance was Yerevan Council of Elders 
(municipal parliament) member; her photo from the performance was shared three times on 
Malian’s Facebook page, in two cases followed by sexual insults. Malian often uses vulgar style 
and the tone of ridicule as part of sensationalist language (see other examples of vulgar style in 
right-wing populist discourse in Ylä-Anttila, Bauvois, Pyrhönen 2019). Participation of the 
Council of Elders member served as one more confirmation of Veto claims that Soros’ agents 
network has penetrated into the structures of the post-revolutionary government — a claim Veto 
frequently makes. Madisson points out that such claims are typical for conspiracy theories with 
anti-own type of antagonist (2014:284) and they lead to picturing the structures of one’s own 
culture as weak and imperfect. Malian calls Armenian statehood attacked by Soros “our poor and 
weak statehood.21” Vagueness of references and multiple contradictions are present in conspiracy 
theory about Soros. However, pointing out to those contradictions is not a cure-all pill because the 
narrative of the theory despite internal inconsistencies is kept together by its code-text (Madisson 
2014: 292-294).  
However, Veto’s usage of this conspiracy theory essentially as a political PR campaign 
leads to certain specific characteristics. Thus, in that same announcement, Malian talks about the 
weakness of statehood but inevitability of his victory over the rich and powerful Soros. He presents 
                                                             
21  https://www.facebook.com/narek.malyan/posts/3020578034637074 
 49 
Soros and his network as greatly powerful but when talking about them often uses mockery and 
cynical humor. Malian does not try to gather devoted like-minded theorists who believe they 
discovered the malicious plan but struggles to acquire legitimacy from the public, appeals to his 
authority as former employee of police and current friend of powerful politicians. Moreover, in 
one interview when asked about it he did not exclude possibility of political career in the future22. 
These contradictions as well as a number of objective factors such as widespread usage of troll 
armies to create an impression of support in social media, makes it difficult (at least at this stage) 
to analyze interpretations and reaction on Veto’s strategic framework.  
 
6.3.2. Istanbul Convention: destroying the nationhood 
On November 1, 2020 leader of Liberation Movement Hayk Ayvazyan and the leader of Veto 
Narek Malian were protesting together in front of Council of Europe office in Yerevan. The cause 
of the protest was the arrival of Council of Europe members for a meeting with Armenian officials 
regarding the ratification of “Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence”, most commonly known as Istanbul Convention. Malian announced that 
“the convention is being propagated mainly by beneficiaries of infamous Soros office, so-called 
‘Soros bastards’23”. Ayvazyan announced the ratification will result in teaching homosexuality as 
a norm in schools24.  The fight against this convention was initiated by Ayvazyan: he was one of 
the firsts in Armenia to speak about the conspiracy theory which effectively disrupted the 
ratification of the convention in a number of European countries. The narrative about the 
convention was woven by European right-wing activists and used as a political tool by 
governments and mainstream parties (Vassileva 2018). It was argued that the convention is created 
to destroy traditional families, introduce the concept of “third gender” to the legal system and 
legalize same-sex marriage. Ayvazyan and other right-wing activists adopted these claims and 
declared the convention a weapon of the European Union in the cultural war against Armenia. The 
very name of the convention, referring to the historical enemy of Armenia, was seen as a sign of 
                                                             
22 https://youtu.be/26PvYota9Fk  
23  https://www.facebook.com/VETOArmenia/posts/2429348597333232 
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ-rEJGiTuk&feature=youtu.be 
 50 
evil nature of this document. Despite the protest (not widespread) from right-wing activists, the 
government signed the convention in January 2018, months before the revolution. However, after 
the revolution, when convention was to be ratified, it turned into a matter of criticism of the new 
government: more democratic, liberal force was seen by the far-right as more Western, hence, 
more likely to support the “EU-imposed” cultural norms. Opposition parties, including the 
previous government which signed the convention, quickly joined the wave of criticism, but the 
leading role in dissemination was still played by the far-right, more precisely, by Kamq. Kamq 
engages actively in acts of protests and organizes petition signing against the convention. For 
nearly 8 months Kamq collects signatures from citizens in front of the Parliament buildings as well 
as travels around the country for that purpose. Members from all groupuscules I observed put their 
signatures; several right-wing parliamentarians from Prosperous Armenia and the ruling My Step 
bloc also joined the petition.  
Armenia is the third worst country for queer people to live in according to ILGA-Europe 
LGBTI rights index25. Extreme homophobia, hate speech such as death calls (specifically calls to 
“burn gays”) are widely common. Expressing homophobia is not a marginal claim to make, quite 
on the contrary. Mudde pointed out (although in relation to political parties) that populist radical 
right offers a simplified and radicalized version of the views shared by the majority of population 
(2011:10). This is especially true in the case of Armenia where nationalism and conservatism 
governed the mainstream discourse of the country for many years. Therefore, there often was a 
great deal of overlap between mainstream political and extreme groupuscular discourse. That is 
why radical right often claim ownership over self-descriptive model of culture: the discourse of 
traditional values and narratives within it are presented not only as the natural way of things, but 
also as the essence of Armenian culture, something with which “Armeniannes” can be defined 
with. Being the axis of conservative discourse, “traditional values” is a vague, ill-defined concept: 
it is usually associated with patriarchal way of life, patriarchal norms of “proper” family and 
household and strictly defined gender roles. In 2017, when Armenia was adopting domestic 
violence law drafted together with civil society representatives, Ayvazyan and his allies protested 
the law accusing it in destruction of family values. Months of criticism and effective exploitation 
                                                             
25  https://rainbow-europe.org/#8620/0/0 
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of popular traditionalist sentiments in social media helped to gain support of parliamentarians. 
Eventually, the law was edited into the law for “restoration of peace in family26” (as I write this 
text, the same process happens in Russia where the draft law was edited to restore the piece in 
family after the protests from radical right). The original draft of the domestic violence law was 
aimed at producing change and it faced serious resistance initiated but not confined to extreme and 
radical right groupuscules. The far-right succeeded in ensuring popular support and eventually 
pushed the government towards reshaping the law into repetition of cultural dominants without 
any real intent or mechanism to initiate change (I am not implying that radical right were the only 
reason for ruling party’s decision, but they were the key factor). Istanbul Convention faced even 
stronger backlashed from the groupuscules I observed. Picked up by mainstream media and 
opposition politicians (some of whom advocated for it before the revolution), the topic became a 
nationwide debate. Parliament eventually postponed ratification hearings.  
During my observation period Hayk Ayvazyan posted a series of collages depicting 
ministers, MPs, pro-government journalists whose photos were montaged with images of drag 
queens and gay couples. The title of the collages stated: 
“THEY are for Istanbul Convention” (Fig. 1). Ayvazyan 
consistently tried to connect the topics of Istanbul 
Convention and queer rights with the post-revolutionary 
government. On November 13, he shared information about 
alleged LGBT conference that took place days before that 
post: “According to our preliminary data, one of the 
organizers was RA [Republic of Armenia] parliamentarian 
hayrapetyan mkhitar”27.  
That is, in the far-right discourse the post-
revolutionary government is linked by various means to 
queerness. This is done within the narratives of two most 
                                                             
26 https://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docID=118672 
27 Spelling is translated in accordance to the original; Ayvazyan and others often write names of their opponents 
with lowercase letters. https://www.facebook.com/hayk.ayvazyan77/posts/2352457494864465  
Figure 1. An example from a series of collages 
shared by Liberation Movement 
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popular conspiracy theories: about George Soros and Istanbul Convention. Meanwhile, queerness 
is a key component in construction of the other. Let me discuss now the mechanists of 
communicating the otherness in far-right discourse.  
 
6.4. Constructing the chaotic other: non-heterosexuals are denied belonging to nation 
I will turn now to the mechanism used by the groupuscules to communicate the chaos of outer 
culture. The central place in it is held by the queer community. The queer people have always been 
marginalized and discriminated against in modern-days Republic of Armenia — from the very 
time of gaining independence in 1991. While in the 1990s the queer community was almost 
completely silent in the public discourse, the situation started changing as more people from the 
new generation of Armenians were gradually changing their attitude. But the process of rising 
visibility of the queer community came at a cost: regular hateful speech, outbreaks of violence and 
harassment, as well as general strong opposition of the mainstream culture to the queer minority. 
Furthermore, after the Velvet Revolution of 2018, the queer issues became one of the hottest 
debates in the country. Both right-wing activists and political parties have been accused of 
manipulating this topic for the benefit of their political agenda via means provided by the post-
revolution chaotic media field. So, they repeatedly blamed the new government in promoting 
homosexuality solely on the ground of representing more democratic political agenda. This is overt 
manipulation, however, a closer look to these texts reveals deep cultural roots of such anti-gay 
rhetoric. 
Belonging to a community, in this case, a nation presented as an ethnic unity, is not granted 
only on the basis of biological heredity or legal dedication: “Belonging cannot be reduced to formal 
citizenship or linguistic or racial affinity but involves an affective dimension which has to do both 
with self-identification and others’ recognition” (Persson 2015:259). Persson described the 
dominant anti-gay narrative constructed in the Russian media where queer minority is not granted 
acceptance: it is described as a) endangering the nation’s demographic growth; b) being a small 
but powerful and hostile element; c) being a symptom of decadent modernity of the West to which 
Russia is opposed as an alternative “special path” (“особый путь”).  
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Much from this narrative has been adopted by the Armenian radical right community (which 
generally sympathizes Russia). The word “pervert” common in Russian context (Persson 
2015:263) is now widely used among the right-wing communities to refer to non-heterosexuals. 
The word itself is aimed at provoking disgust and directly signifies lack of morality thus putting 
the queer community out of the scope of moral responsibility of the speakers. Hayk Ayvazyan 
from Liberation Movement explained the meaning of the word:  
Gender” describes the social sex, in contrast to man and woman — the biological sex. Social sex is what a 
person feels, what they are being taught to [feel]. When the social sex does not coincide with biological sex, 
then the human nature is being perverted, and such a person is called a “pervert” (homosexuals, transvestites, 
etc.)28  
Non-heterosexuals are pictured as alien and incomprehensive phenomena. Ayvazyan often shares 
photos of drug queens in expressive costumes — something that deviates from what the usual, 
acceptable image of how a person should dress in binary gender system. Another example is the 
huZANQ uZANG modern dance performance. While its authors stated the performance was a 
staging of classical works of Armenian poetry — names everyone knows from school — the actual 
performance was not similar to the representation of that classical poetry that people are used to 
see: it was a modern adaptation with unusual dance moves, unusual costumes. In short, it was all 
but the familiar classics. One parliamentarian even described the performance as “roars” of the 
beasts29. Ayvazyan posted a video about the dance montaged with a drag queen show in the best 
traditions of the épater la bourgeoisie. The bizarre “differentness” of the queer community is 
enhanced by the fact that in Armenia, as in many other countries (Persson 2015:271), queer people 
hide their sexuality and are not thus visible for their families or friends. Therefore, media 
representation becomes the only way an average Armenian could encounter non-heterosexuality. 
I should add that adequate discussion around queerness is not held on television and the majority 
of mainstream news outlets, which is why the representation offered by the radical right (which 
                                                             
28 http://armsovereignty.com/archives/1935   
29 Similar description appeared in the radical right discourse and in the mainstream media after the notorious 
attack in Shurnukh village, the first big scandal around queer community after the revolution. Then, the group of 
people who visited the village were beaten by the mob, and later described by local authority as having “voices like 
that of wolves or beasts” and disturbing calm life of people. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cm9x8y6cEJ4 .  
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Shirinian terms “hypervisible figure of the homosexual”, see section 4.3) dominates the media. 
Alternative representations offered by the queer activists do not have high public visibility.   
On one hand, the queer community is bound with culture by birth. Thus, queer people are 
expected to be carriers of what is often called “Armenian genes”. This phrase, popular in 
conservative discourse and mocked by young liberals, is used to describe the cultural memory; the 
very same phenomena which Lotman and Uspensky, followed by Aleida and Jan Assman, 
famously characterized as “nonhereditary” (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 213). However, queer 
community often deviates from the Armenianness (as it is seen in the self-description of the 
culture) and is represented by the far-right as culturally other. Being defined as memory, culture 
thus is understood by Lotman and Uspenky as oriented towards the past and not geared to 
knowledge about the future. “Consequently, at the moment of its appearance, culture cannot be 
recorded as such, for it is only perceived ex post facto” (Lotman, Uspensky 1978:214). Some 
phenomena may end up not being recorded in the collective memory and not because they never 
existed. In order for given phenomena to be recorded in collective memory, it has to be 
“acknowledged as existing; that is, it must be identified with a specific element in the language of 
the organization which is committing it to memory” (ibid.). References to the general past (and 
not a defined historical period) are common in groupuscular right discourse in Armenia. Lotman 
and Uspensky’s concepts allow to determine reasons these arguments are more than just a 
reference to habitual lifestyle: if there was no queerness recorded in the memory of the collective, 
then queerness cannot be part of culture, it is necessarily out of culture (although extensive body 
of research on sexuality have already showed that “not recorded” in history does not equal to “not 
existed” in history).    
 
6.5. Queer community as the model violator of the pre-established order  
Lotman proposed the topological terms of inner, outer and the boundary to discuss models of 




From the point of view of that culture which is accepted as the norm and whose language becomes the 
metalanguage of that cultural typology, the systems which are opposed to it appear not as other types of 
organization, but as non-organization. They are characterized not by the presence of other features, but by the 
absence of features of structure (Lotman 1975: 97). 
The customs and laws of a given culture are seen as having a divine origin to which unorganized, 
unstructured outer culture is contrasted (Lotman 1975: 105). The divine pre-established order is 
not subject to human manipulation: “In this antithesis, that which is created by man is considered 
disorderly and contrasted to the order of a higher organization” (Lotman 1975: 97). The 
groupuscules I observed construct the outer sphere by this logic. The family here becomes one of 
the main representations of that order. Family is sacred: it is registered by church in a special ritual, 
and while this ritual has no legal force, many Armenians consider it the main way to get married 
and may undergo civil registration only years later, when documented proof of marriage is required 
for some reason. Non-heterosexual people are seen first of all as those who challenge the sacred 
family hence challenging the order itself. The “perverts” who opted for “social sex”, as Ayvazyan 
puts it, impose human changes on divine structure. This is also why the trans community is targeted 
heavily. Trans people are demonized, activists I observed selected photos of trans people in 
diabolic costumes, repeatedly called “prostitutes” and accused of aiming to “pervert” children.  
Non-heterosexuals are denied belonging to the community: they are thought as elements 
injected by the decadent West, which, being outside of the own culture, is a territory of ultimate 
chaos. The outer chaos, in its turn, brings the parallels with the afterworld and the carrier of chaos, 
the devil. This is why Kamq allies performed frankincense burning ritual․ Kamq ally Marina 
Khachatryan called the dancers “people of the darkness”. “We will pray and play our Komitas, 
that is the high art, that is the high value, the Armenian, and not the roars that happened yesterday”, 
says Khachatryan. She adds: “We put our feet into the dark and light up”. Vahagn Chakhalyan 
also took part in the ritual, he stated: “Be good, dear compatriots, we are not surrendering our 
country easily.”  
Such rhetoric of existential danger and the need to fight it may seem absurd: after all, the 
“enemy” is a small community of people deprived of basic rights. However, this enemy is not 
alone: it is part and parcel of the external chaos which penetrated the inner culture and strived to 
destroy its order. Destruction of the order and structure would mean chaos, hence blurring of the 
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boundary between the inner and outer culture. Elimination of the boundary is “comparable to the 
destruction of the model itself” (Lotman 1975:112).  
In summary we could say that the nonlinear nature of collective memory easily allows the 
stretching and compressing of time: many customs and traditions are thought to be thousands of 
years old, and it does not really matter when and under what kind of influence they actually 
originated from. Furthermore, the traditional patriarchal structure of the society is understood as 
the sacred pre-established order which cannot be challenged without challenging the existence of 
the culture itself. That is why the far-right activists talk about the queer community in the realm 
of categories of the whole nation, its sovereignty and its very existence. Thus, it is logical for the 
radical right narrative to portray the new government — itself perceived as a bunch of Western 
liberals — as in union with those who bring chaos to Armenia.   
 
6.6. Queerness at the bilingual/ polylingual border of the semiosphere 
It is not a coincidence that queer discourse brings a lot of new words to Armenian. Most of these 
words are borrowed from English and have become common international terms. But Armenian 
is a language with a strong tradition of purism. That is, most neologisms quickly find their localized 
form through root-for-root translation (like in Estonian, even the word “computer” has its localized 
form “համակարգիչ”). In queer discourse, however, language purism is rarely practiced; it is full 
of loanwords. Self-defining words like “queer” and “LGBT”, or key terms like “gender” are not 
translated. Because the queer discourse itself is marginal, these words did not end up incorporated 
in mainstream language. They sound “external” and they signify meanings which have always 
been excluded from the discourse, declared non-existent. Therefore, the signifier and signified in 
these words is often equated: these “external”-sounding words are thought to mean “external” 
phenomena. So, loanwords further strengthen the misconception that non-heterosexuality is not 
native to Armenian culture but was brought from outside.   
In this sense, it is noteworthy that the term “LGBT” is often mispronounced, which 
highlights either deliberate undermining of this term, or that its meaning is little understood. For 
example, RPA member Margarit Yesayan said in an Interview on November 5: “I was watching 
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who was protesting 1.5 years ago [during Velvet Revolution], who gathered at those squares, and 
there were mainly supporters and members of the NGOs which want the LGTP community to be 
more active in the Republic of Armenia, to act legally, their activities not to be incognito”30.  This 
mistake – LGTP instead of LGBT – is not an isolated case. 
The word “gender” has been equated to pejorative term, it is sometimes used as a 
metonymy for non-heterosexual people, as well as feminists31. Hayk Ayvazyan used “gender” to 
build his definition of the term “pervert” (see section 6.4).   
At the same time, not everything “filtered in” from the outside semiosphere remains 
untranslated. Many words, like 
“homosexual”, find their root-to-root 
translation in Armenia (fitting into the 
tradition of language purism). Such 
translated neologisms introduced by queer 
discourse are many. And not only separate 
words get transformed, but also whole texts. 
One example is modern dance performance 
huZANQ uZANG. Although it was not 
dedicated to the topic of homosexuality per 
se, it was challenging gender norms and thus fits into queer discourse. Creators describe the 
performance as “female body’s public emancipation by doing art. huZANQ uZANG questions the 
public perceptions of female behavior, way of talking and moving in public”32. As mentioned 
above, the far-right accused the performance of being “lesbian” and “satanist” event. But the entire 
performance was based on classical works of Armenian futurism of early 20th century. One of the 
authors featured in huZANQ uZANG was Yeghishe Charents. Many of his texts – including queer 
poetry – are less known to the wider public, but he is the author of the most famous patriotic poem 
                                                             
30 https://youtu.be/MiZN2-kZXDk?t=677 
31 See, for example, http://w.louysonline.com/archives/Complete-New-1/253-
WEB/Printed%20Version%20253%20Armenian-color--.htm 
32 https://www.facebook.com/events/529012534602341/ 
Figure 2. huZANQ uZANG performance 
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“I Love My Sweet Armenia's…”, which is taught in schools across the country. This layer of 
Armenian cultural heritage was mixed in the performance with art objects created in the manner 
of Kazimir Malevich’s suprematism (Fig. 2) and was accompanied by experimental style of 
reading. That is, texts from Armenian culture were mixed with “outside” texts, that of Russian 
suprematist art (although we should note that Malevich’s significance is not limited to Russian 
culture).  
We can thus say that huZANQ uZANG created a new text based on the mix of suprematist 
art, experimental reading of the 20th century futurist trends and textbook items of Armenian poetic 
tradition. This semiotic translation of the “outside” texts was, however, rejected by the far-right 
precisely because the performance was not offering “pure” example of Armenian culture, but 
rather an international mishmash. 
Thus, one can state that the marginal queerness of Armenian culture is 
bilingual/polylingual. Lotman writes, that the border of the semiosphere is “an area of enhanced 
meaning generation” (2005:2014) and is always bilingual/polylingual. Bilingualism of the border 
makes it able to perform an act of translation (thus an act of communication) between the own and 
the other semiosphere.  
The far-right, on the other hand, claim to represent the pure Armeniannes, something not 
diluted with external influences. Characteristic of nationalistic discourse, these claims outline a set 
of special features that define being an Armenian for the far-right. It is argued that queer people, 
despite being born Armenian, are a mix of those “Armenian” features with alien ones, and thus 
cannot represent the true Armeniannes. The far-right see themselves as those who understand and 
describe the culture “correctly”. i.e. who define Armenianness per se. The queers for them dilute 
Armenian culture with external influences and hence are a deviation from their “correct” 
description.  
However, if we look at the culture not from point of view of the far-right groups, we can 
see that these groups were also marginal. Even before the revolution, they did not have serious 
power, in a sense that they did not hold the key positions in legislative, judicial or executive 
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branches of the government. But for two decades, central discourses in Armenia have been 
nationalistic and largely corresponded to how the far-right perceive the culture. For example, the 
far-right had sensible presence in academia. This is evident from the protests around educational 
reforms: when changes in Armenian church history, Armenian language and literature curricula 
were announced, the far-right started protesting them together with the mainstream conservative 
political parties, especially the ARF and PA. After the revolution, the far-right claim to be unfairly 
pushed to the margins, while those at the margins of society unfairly seized power. For example, 
Adekvad’s leader Arthur Danielyan calls Velvet Revolution “Soros-led coup d’etat”33.  
During a protest Istanbul Convention, Liberation Movement leader Hayk Ayvazyan 
announced: 
The filthy Sorosians who have occupied state positions are so lazy, they are so incompetent that they are 
not able to pass Istanbul Convention on their own, that is why they have sent troops from abroad to help 
them in passing  the Istanbul Convention. […] Since 2018, Armenian authorities have given negative 
conclusions to a number of draft laws banning same-sex marriage in Armenia, adoption of children by 
same-sex couples, and homosexuality propaganda among children. 
Ayvazyan listed the law proposals by largest Parliamentary opposition party PA (see section 7.2) 
aimed at creating constraints to queer rights promotion. He also spoke of a law proposed by the 
government which, in his view, was aimed at promoting same-sex unions.  He then went on: 
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned realities, as well as the unprecedented aggressive and 
hostile actions of the new government against the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church and the Catholicos, 
we state that the current government of the Republic of Armenia are engaged in unhindered propaganda 
of homosexuality, hindering perversion as a norm among children, as well as granting broad privileged 
rights to people with a another gender identity, or so-called LGBT individuals. Therefore, we call on all 
public and political organizations, initiatives, respectable and conscious citizens of the Republic of 
Armenia to join the ’Neither Istanbul, nor the perversion’ initiative, in order to neutralize the threats 
against the Armenian national, spiritual and traditional value system34. 
The church in Armenia is one of the most powerful national institutions. While one could debate 
on how actively religion is practiced, the church itself is considered one of the pillars of the nation 
(noteworthy, the Armenian church distinguished itself from other churches in the region centuries 
                                                             
33 Interview to Freewestmedia.com, https://freewestmedia.com/2019/08/02/we-offer-an-alternative-for-armenia/  
 
34 Yerevan.Today, https://youtu.be/yQ-rEJGiTuk. “Neither Istanbul, nor the perversion“ was never active; it has a 
Facebook page, but the abovementioned speech by Ayvazyan is the only post on it.   
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ago, now it is a church if one nation). Ayvazyan states that the new government initiated 
“aggressive and hostile actions” towards the church and then concludes from that statement that 
the government if engages in “unhindered propaganda of homosexuality” (Taking into 
consideration…we state that…). Thus he binds together the attack on nationhood with defending 
queer right.  
Ayvazyan and others opposing the Istanbul Convention use this conspiracy theory to 
present it as “anti-national” and dangerous. The Convention is viewed as inherently alien 
phenomena which could penetrate Armenia only through queers – marginal people subjected to 
external influences. They present the post-revolutionary government as queer (that is, possessing 
external influence rather than pure Armenianness) and use narratives like the one about Istanbul 
Convention at a tool to prove it.  
However, if we look closer, the far-right share as much with external world as the queers: 
many of them are part of international far-right initiatives and use extensive borrowings from 
international narratives. For example, conspiracy theories like that of George Soros or Istanbul 
Convention were borrowed and adapted to Armenian realia from external sphere.  
After the revolution, mainstream conservative parties which were actually holding key 
positions in lawmaking, academia, art, etc. borrow from the far-right discourse. By doing so, they 
are strengthening the self-perception of the far right as the representatives of the true core which 
was pushed away to the periphery by unjust and abnormal deviation from the regular flow of 
things, that is, the Velvet Revolution.  
In what follows, I’ll show how the mainstream political parties borrow from the far-right 






7. MAINSTREAM CONSERVATIVE PARTIES: RESEMIOTISIZING THE FAR-
RIGHT 
 
In this chapter I will discuss how mainstream conservative parties incorporate the topics voiced by 
the far-right in their activities but undertake contradictory positions regarding those topics. Using 
the example of Istanbul Convention, I will show how mainstream parties on the one hand advocate 
for treating legal documents as a formality, a non-binding issue, and on the other hand declare the 
necessity to create a legislative basis for defending so-called traditional values. That is, in speeches 
of mainstream politicians a legal document, Istanbul Convention, is a self-modelling text which is 
and should be detached from the existing cultural practice. At the same time, politicians 
resemiotisize far-right claim into a legislative proposal in order to eliminate “misinterpretations” 
of existing cultural practice.  
 
7.1. The self-modelling text of the Istanbul Convention and the two ways to approach it 
Lotman developed the notion of self-model to explain how “complicated and contradictory 
complex” of any culture develops unity at the level of self-description. That is, self-models 
highlight certain dominants within a given culture which helps to build “a unified system that 
should serve as a code for self-knowledge and self-decoding of the texts of this culture” (Lotman 
1971:170). Lotman differentiates three types of self-models:  
1) those that try to be maximally similar to the culture;  
2) those that differ from existing cultural practice and seek to change that practice;  
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3) those that function in ideal self-consciousness of culture, separately from exiting 
cultural practice and do not seek convergence with that practice. 
Self-models can be concrete texts, laws, etc. Madisson brings following examples of self-models, 
respectively: 1) a course syllabus; 2) Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism; 3) the theory of pure art 
(Madisson 2016b:208). Lotman himself explains that the model of Russian state in Peter I-era 
legislation can be viewed as a self-model of second type. Third type self-models include laws that 
are adopted but are not meant to be put into practice (Lotman 1971:170-171).  
As mentioned in section 4.3, pre-2018 Armenian authoritarian government was 
characterized with “artificial ideology” utilizing ultra-nationalism; the government’s policies 
“were not shaped by ideology, but rather, by a drive to consolidate illegitimate power through 
patronalistic35 politics” (Kopalyan 2018).  RPA and its coalition partner ARF were not anti-
Western or anti-democratic, nor were they explicitly rejecting democratic reforms. Quite on the 
contrary: they were not blocking civil society from receiving funding from the West, and the 
government itself was eager to adopt certain reforms funded from the West (usually EU). However, 
it was not a democratic government, the reforms were occasional, non-systemic and not meant at 
eliminating corruption or building transparent government and equal society. Self-models 
generated at that period (for example, European-style laws) could be regarded as the third type of 
self-models, i.e. models that function separately from exiting cultural practice and do not seek 
convergence with that practice. Let me discuss this process with the example of Istanbul 
Convention, a legal document that can be considered a self-modelling text.  
Istanbul Convention is a legislative document aimed to combat violence against women 
and domestic violence. The text includes the view of gender as social phenomena, disapprove 
discrimination of any kind, including discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation. 
Successful implementation of the convention in traditionalist societies, such as Armenian, is both 
a legal and cultural matter. As discussed in section 6.3.2, the conspiracy theory about “Western-
imposed” convention is one of the central topics of the far-right discourse in post-revolutionary 
                                                             
35 Kopalyan uses here Henry Hale’s notion of patronalism which describes political culture in post-Soviet space 
based on personal ties and exchange of rewards rather than abstract ideological beliefs.   
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Armenia. It was signed in 2018, couple of months before the revolution, by RPA-majority 
Parliament. According to the procedure, ratification was meant to follow short, and the fact that it 
started during Pashinyan’s rule was a technical, and not an ideological matter.  
On November 5, in an interview to Iravunk news outlet, RPA member Margarit Yesayan 
said: “The Istanbul Convention could have been left as it was – signed but not ratified. But from 
the very first day of their coming to power, they [the new government] and Soros grant-eating 
NGOs brought up the issue of Istanbul Convention.” As I cited earlier in section 6.6, she continued 
saying that during the revolution protesters were mainly representatives of “those NGOs” who 
want queer community in Armenia to “act legally”: “I am surprised at the editors who say that 
there is no LGBT in the Istanbul Convention. But the convention does not speak about couples, it 
speaks about partners!”36    
First, Yesayan repeats here common statement about Istanbul Convention promoting same-
sex marriage because it does not specify that a family is a unity of a man and woman but uses a 
concept of partner instead. This statement is widely used in far-right discourse, and it is similar to 
criticism which Istanbul Convention faced in other countries, for example, in Bulgaria. Second, 
Yesayan states that there was no need to ratify, i.e. to give official legal power to the document. 
That is, Yesayan, being a ruling party MP, gave her consent to sign the document and thus provide 
formal agreement for Istanbul Convention to be applicable to regulate social relations in Armenia. 
She, however, does not see any point in actually applying Istanbul Convention because, to her, 
social relations in Armenia are not and should not be similar to the ones described in the 
convention.  
Another example of this sigh-but-not-ratify argument is November 29 speech by one of the 
most well-known members of ARF, Artsvik Minasyan, whose party and he himself were in a 
coalition government with RPA. Minasyan was speaking at a round table meeting organized by 
opposition National Agenda party and dedicated to Istanbul Convention. Both far-right activists 
and representatives or mainstream conservative parties were present at the meeting: Minasyan was 
                                                             
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiZN2-kZXDk&t=678s&ab_channel=iTV  
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sitting just two seats away from Liberation Movement leader Hayk Ayvazyan. Talking about the 
need to adopt laws to protect traditional valued (see below), Minasyan criticized the government 
for being sympathetic to Istanbul Convention and manipulating the issue: “These manipulation 
that it was signed in the past, and we have to now [ratify it] is an absurd justification, there is 
nothing like that in reality.”37    
These statements by RPA and AFR members present Istanbul Convention as a law which 
is formally adopted but is not meant to be put in practice. That is, from their point of view the 
convention is a self-model of third type (Lotman 1971:170-171): they see no contradiction in 
legislation which describes a world detached from the existing cultural practice.  
Compare these statements to the words of Minister of social affairs Zaruhi Batoyan, who 
until recently was the only female minister in Pashinyan’s cabinet38. On November 1, asked by a 
journalist about her opinion on the convention, Batoyan said:  
The ratifying body is the National Assembly39, and the National Assebly must ratify it. If a convention is 
signed, a convention must be ratified. [...] The government of the Republic of Armenia has undertaken its 
readiness [to defend] human right, signed it, and now has to ratify.  
Asked if there is a possibility to not ratify the document, Batoyan said: “Of course, there is always 
such a possibility”. Answering the follow-up question on whether she is in favor of the convention, 
she likewise said: “Of course I am in favor”4041.  
Batoyan’s position is the opposite of those that RPA and ARF have. The post-revolutionary 
ruling power declared anti-corruption and other reforms their top priority (it also came under 
criticism later for not implementing the institutional reforms efficiently). They came to power with 
                                                             
37 https://www.arfd.am/news/20554/  
38 After the defeat in was with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan reshuffled the cabinet and dismissed its only female member.  
39 The Parliament of Armenia.  
40 https://168.am/2019/11/01/1197561.html  
41 Batoyan, along with MPs Gayane Abrahamyan, Maria Karapetyan (who spoke about the cultural change that 
revolution brings, see section 3.2) and others has been in civil society before 2018. She is an example of new type 
of politicians that the Velvet Revolution brought to power: representatives of civil society whose previous work 
was about advocacy for equality and human rights. In the parliament, these politicians formed the left wing of My 
Step’s “big tent”.  
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the promise of political, social and cultural change. This implies that Velvet Revolution created 
suitable conditions for emergence of second type of self-models, i.e. those that seek to change 
existing cultural practice. The far-right and mainstream conservative politicians managed to turn 
Istanbul Convention into a hot potato for the government, and the hearing on ratification was 
postponed (but not cancelled). However, other legislative initiatives seeking to change cultural 
practice (by addressing problems like hate speech, domestic violence, corruption etc.) were or are 
being adopted. No legislation explicitly addressing queer rights issues has been developed, but 
Pashinyans Parliament speech in defense of transgender athlete (see section 2.1) was generally 
accepted as a major step forward and the first instance of criticism of homophobia/transphobia on 
such high level.           
 
7.2. Resemiotization of the threat of legal same-sex marriages  
On November 12, the Parliament discussed two amendments42 to the family law by PA member 
Gevorg Petrosyan. The amendments were first introduced earlier in September and proposed to 
ban “persons of the same sex as well as persons at least one of whom have changed their sex” to 
marry or adopt children. Both the family law, and the constitution of Armenia do not allow same-
sex marriages. These proposals came at the time of a series of scandals featuring a constructed 
threat of same-sex marriages. Petrosyan’s amendments were eventually rejected by the Parliament. 
However, they became a matter of a fierce public debate in the highest legislative body of the 
country and brought the threat of same-sex marriages from the far-right discourse to the 
mainstream – to the level of legal document by an established lawmaker. In this section, I argue 
that the very format of a legislative proposal was a resemiotization of the far-right discourse around 
queer rights and Istanbul Convention.  
Concerns about the Istanbul Convention were voiced by the far-right years before the 
government signed it43. In Armenian far-right discourse Istanbul Convention is not a solution for 
domestic violence problem, but a document which malicious foreign actors use to pave the way 
                                                             
42 http://www.parliament.am/drafts.php?sel=showdraft&DraftID=10758&Reading=0  
http://www.parliament.am/drafts.php?sel=showdraft&DraftID=10764&Reading=0&lang=arm&enc=utf8  
43 http://stop-g7.com/archives/341  
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for same-sex marriages to be legalized and for the foundations of Armenian culture to be destroyed. 
This interpretation stems from the self/other opposition which is built on the contrast of traditional 
values and pure Armenianness on one hand, and the queerness understood as externally influenced 
deviation on the other hand. Furthermore, this interpretation is a result of layering of the text of 
the convention onto the discourse dominated by the “hypervisible figure of the homosexual” 
(Shirinian 2016). The far-right construct a threat in the form legal same-sex marriages and use the 
language of war and conflict to describe this threat (see section 6.2).  
Several members of Parliament, including Gevorg Petrosyan directly supported the far-
right by signing the anti-Istanbul Convention petition of Kamq (the whole process was also 
broadcast live). Petrosyan announced that he put his signature because the convention is against 
the Constitution and Armenian values: “What does ‘partners’ mean? […] We all grew up in 
traditional families and we must inherit such family to our children”44. Several days after his 
appearance at Kamq protest Petrosyan presented his law proposals at the Parliament, criticizing 
the ruling MPs for not giving positive evaluation to his draft law.  
The texts of draft laws themselves consisted of two sections. In the first section, it was 
proposed to add several short phrases to the family law specifying the ban of same-sex marriage 
and adoption of kids. The second section provided justification of the need to pass the amendments. 
The texts differed from speeches at the protests by usage of more impersonal, formal language. 
Kamq members, whose focus is protesting Istanbul Convention, often use passionate, personalized 
language: “Be good, dear compatriots, we are not surrendering our country easily”. In contrast to 
this, Petrosyan’s proposal used highly formalized, less personalized language. It contained 
multiple references to other legal documents, used little or no personal pronouns: “The proposal is 
expected to ensure the implementation of the state policy goals defined by the Constitution, as well 
as ensure the implementation of the rights of a child defined by international legal acts.”45  
                                                             
44 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ul0EnzULj6o&feature=emb_title&ab_channel=NEWSAM  
45 Of course, in some cases the groupuscules, especially Liberation Movement, mimics the formal style of legal 
document in their speeches. However, their texts lack the status of legal document as their not presented in 
accordance to specific procedure.  
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Iedema states that during resemiotization an organizational process takes place which 
“stabilizes specific meaning and in doing so resemiotisizes those meanings into more durable 
manifestations” (Iedema 2001:35).  In such processes “each recontextualization appears to add to 
the ‘weight’, the institutional importance, the authority, in short, the facticity, of what is said and 
written”. Iedema calls this process a set of “fact-producing transformations”, because each new 
step includes increasingly “durable” semiotics (Iedema 2003:43).  
The threat of legalization of the same-sex marriages was constructed by the far-right by 
juxtaposition of a conspiracy theory and real legal document which was not at all regulating queer 
right as its primary issue. By creating law proposals and participating in official parliamentary 
hearings on the topic, PA provided the aforementioned institutional importance, facticity to the 
threat constructed in far-right speeches and protests. Suddenly, the parliament was spending hours 
for discussing a proposal to ban something which the legislation never allowed. Despite the 
amendments were eventually rejected, the mere fact of legislative initiative taking place 
“confirmed” existence of the problem.  
Answering to the criticism that same-sex marriages are already not legal in Armenia, 
Petrosyan said that his aim is to eliminate possible misreading and loose interpretations: “If we 
really want to ban marriage of homosexuals and transgenders in Armenia, let’s not try to solve the 
question by legal misperceptions. Let’s clearly write [it] in family law”46. 
ARF member Artsvik Minasyan had similar argument. At the aforementioned Istanbul 
Convention round table he proposed a roadmap comprised of two actions:  
As I mentioned, it is strengthening legislative protection for these values, defended values: motherhood, 
family, respect… This means initiating bills. The Constitution allows us to show a civil initiative, create a 
law, force the parliament to adopt that law or if not, this law will go to a referendum. Second action is creation 
of judicial precedents […] up to Court of cassation […] for it not to be possible to interpret in some other 
way47. 
PA and ARF politicians in this case directly describe creating legislations as a process aimed at 
eliminating negotiability of the issue. Iedema states, that “as a result of the resemiotizations 
                                                             
46 https://youtu.be/H5i0xRF61_0  
47 https://www.arfd.am/news/20554/  
 68 
achieved, constraints built up around the negotiability of outcomes” (2001:43). That is, each step 
of resemiotization adds up to the facticity of the outcome and makes it less negotiable. A far-right 
activist’s speech at a protest about Istanbul Convention imposing same-sex marriages is highly 
negotiable, temporal format of meaning-making. In Iedema’s terms, “resemiotization logic” 
pushes it towards more specialized practice (such as lawmaking; ibid.). In this process, a poorly 
grounded theory common in the groupuscular right discourse acquires difficultly deniable 
materiality in a legislative proposal: a bill makes the threat of same-sex marriages less invented, 
























This thesis applied semiotic approach to analyze far-right discourse and its interweaving with 
mainstream conservative parties’ discourse. I described the structure of the far-right communities 
in post-revolutionary Armenia using Roger Griffin’s concept of groupuscule. Furthermore, I used 
concepts from Tartu-Moscow school and contemporary semiotic research on far-right 
communities conducted at the University of Tartu to discuss the instrumentalization of conspiracy 
theories in far-right discourse and answer the first research question: how does the groupuscular 
right in Armenia construct the otherness? Finally, I used Yuri Lotman’s concept of self-model and 
Rick Iedema’s concept of resemiotization to answer the second research question: how specific 
claims from groupuscular right discourse transform in the discourse of mainstream conservative 
political parties? 
Four far-right groups (Adekvad, Liberation Movement, Kamq, Veto) most visible in the 
press in Armenia  after the Velvet Revolution have structure and activities characteristic of the 
groupuscules. They are small, uncentered, non-party political formations which became highly 
visible with their attacks against queer minority and post-revolutionary government. These groups 
have extreme or radical right ideology, lack of rigid hierarchical organization, fluid membership 
base. Some of them have populist style, some are explicitly neo-fascist. All of them deny 
universality of human rights and advocate for “purity of culture” thus presenting reformist version 
of fascist ideology. 
Despite lack of party-like organization and institutionalized power, all the groups I 
observed have similarities in how they construct the outer sphere of the culture. The far-right use 
conspiracy narratives to communicate the figure of enemy.  In conspiracy theory about billionaire 
George Soros and his “agents network” the far-right combine two types of enemy figure: non-own 
(that comes from the outer chaotic sphere) and anti-own (that comes from the inner negative 
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structures). Both in Soros and in Istanbul Convention conspiracy theories dangerous outer 
influence is linked to the queer community. Outer sphere is seen as a sphere of disorder and chaos, 
and queerness is how that chaos penetrates into inner sphere. The post-revolutionary power holders 
are presented as defenders of gays and thus part of Soros’ “agents network” which penetrated the 
state institutions.      
Queerness is argued to be absent from the cultural memory and not fitting self-description 
of culture (the Armenianness as the far-right see it). Therefore, queerness is seen as inherently 
alien. Queer discourse is at the periphery of the semiosphere, at its bilingual/polylingual border. 
Using the case of modern dance performance huZANQ uZANG I showed how canonical texts of 
inner sphere are mixed with external texts in semiotic translation. This is characteristic of the 
periphery of semiosphere, and it is rejected by the far-right, who claim to represent the pure 
Armeniannes, the “correct” self-description of the culture.  
Thus, for the far-right the Velvet Revolution is not a victory of the Armenian people but a 
triumph of injustice. For them people connected to “agents” which bring outer chaos and danger 
into inner sphere took over the state power, while they, who hold “pure culture”, were pushed to 
the margins.  
The three major conservative parties of Armenia instrumentalize far-right claims. Using 
the example of Istanbul Convention, I showed how the far-right construct the threat of legal same-
sex marriages. The far-right activities against the convention were picked up by politicians who 
signed that very same document before the revolution. However, there is a contradiction in the 
mainstream parties’ approach to Istanbul Convention. 
On one hand, parties support far-right claim that the ratification of the document will pave 
a way for legalization of same-sex marriages in Armenia. Their support is manifested either by 
personally joining the respective petition, or in their speeches and other texts. Politicians argue 
that despite they signed the convention before the revolution, it should not be ratified, i.e. should 
not be put in practice. In their speeches the Istanbul Convention is an example of the third type of 
Lotmanian self-model which functions separately from exiting cultural practice and does not seek 
convergence with that practice.  
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On the other hand, politicians resemiotisize the far-right claim about same-sex marriages 
into a legislative bill. It is argued that laws and judicial precedents need to be created to effectively 
protect so-called traditional values and eliminate “misperceptions” and “misinterpretations”, i.e. 
seal the correct interpretation of the concept of family, an interpretation which will correspond to 
the existing common model of family. Using the example of two bills banning same-sex marriages 
and adoption, I showed how mainstream politicians resemiotisize far-right-constructed threat of 
legal same-sex marriages. This process of resemiotization provides more facticity to the poorly 
grounded claim, makes it less negotiable. In short, resemiotization of far-right claim into a 
legislative proposal makes that claim less invented, more real.  
 This thesis investigated far-right construction of otherness and interweaving of far-right 
and mainstream conservative parties’ discourse. One important issue that was not address in the 
current work is the perception of these discourses by the public. One direction of future research 
might be analysis of public perception of far-right and mainstream parties’ massaging regarding 
queerness and post-revolutionary democracy-building. Transformation of these two discourses in 
other discourses, such as in speeches of progressive communities or pro-reform parties might be 
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Magistritöö „Tähendusloome analüüs paremäärmuslaste ja konservatiivsete erakondade 
diskursiivses kommunikatsioonis: revolutsioonijärgse Armeenia näitel“  vastab kahele 
uurimisküsimusele:  
 
1.   Kuidas Armeenia paremäärmuslased teisesust semiootiliselt konstrueerivad?  
2. Kuidas paremäärmusliku diskursuse tuumideed transformeeruvad peavoolu konservatiivsete 
erakondade diskursuses? 
  
Paremäärmusliku kommunikatsiooni kontseptualiseerimisel kasutatakse magistritöö Roger 
Griffini arendatud grupuskuli mõistet, mida täiendati  Tartu-Moskva koolkonna 
kultuurisemiootika ideedega. Peavoolu kuuluvate konservatiivsete erakondade  diskursuse analüüs 
viidi läbi Lotmani enesemudeli ja Iedema resemiotiseerimise mõisteid kasutades 
 
Lõputöö tulemusena tuuakse välja, et paremäärmuslikes diskursustes on üheks peamisteks  
vaenlase konstrueerimise vahendiks vandenõuteooriad ning paremäärmuslaste minna-pildile 
vastanduv queer-kogukond. Viimastes nähakse oma “puhta“ armeenia kultuurile vastanduva välise 
mõjutuse sümbolit, mida sageli seostakase revolutsioonijärgse poliitilise eliidiga.   
Äärmusparempoolsete jaoks kehastab sametine revolutsioon ülekohust ja ebaõiglust, mille 
tagajärjel võõra ja välise kultuurisfääriga seotud inimesed usurpeerisid võimu, samas kui ennast 
nähakse kannatajatena, „puhta kultuuri“ kandjatena, keda revolutsioonijärgses uues poliitilises 
situatsioonis suruti poliitilisse perifeeriasse.   
 
Töö teises osas analüüsitakse, kuidas peavoolu kuuluvad konservatiivsed jõud kasutavad  
paremäärmuslaste ideid oma poliitilise agenda seadmisel ja diskursuse ülesehitamisel. Konkreetse 
näitena analüüsitakse Istanbuli konvetsiooniga seotud diskursust. Konservatiivsed poliitilised jõud 
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resemiotiseerivad paremäärmuslikus diskursuses levivad poliitilised nõuded seadusandlikeks 
ettepanekuteks, et niimoodi delegitimeerida traditsiooniliste kultuuripraktikatega vastuollu 
minevaid liberaalseid ideid.    
 
Töö tulemusi saab kasutada tulevaste uuringute alusmaterjalina. Üks perspektiivikas suund oleks  
keskendumine avalikule diskursusele laiemalt. Esialgse uurimisprobleemi võib sõnastada 
järgmiselt:  millist rolli omab  queer-teema erinevate Armeenia poliitiliste jõudude poliitilises 
diskuruses, milliste väärtustega seda teemat agendasse seatakse ja kuidas see  poliitilise võitluse 
tulemusel kujuneb. 
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